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An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in the




Reports of the impending death of the collateral source rule are greatly
exaggerated.' The rule is, in fact, alive and well in American courthouses despite
being subject to forces that many predicted would lead to its demise.2 In the past
twenty years, its abrogation was forecasted by scholars examining U.S.
healthcare legislation,3 by tort reform advocates,4 and by writers promoting the
increase in the use and exercise of subrogation rights by health insurance
providers This Article examines why the collateral source rule, an "oddit[y] of
* Assistant Professor of Lawyering Skills, University of Dayton School of Law. The author would like
to thank his colleagues at University of Dayton School of Law who provided encouragement in the writing of
and feedback on the ideas in this Article; Liz Barajas, for her legal research and writing assistance; and my
wife, Dr. Cynthia D. Richards, for her patience and support during the writing of this Article. Parts of this
Article were delivered as presentations at the 2008 Conference of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools
and at University of Dayton School of Law in 2011.
1. This sentence plays off of a phrase attributed to Mark Twain who is reported to have said, "The
reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated," after hearing that his obituary had been published in the
New York Journal. See JAMES H. BILLINGTON, RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 76
(2010).
2. Among those predicting its demise were: Daena A. Goldsmith, A Survey of the Collateral Source
Rule: The Effects of Tort Reform and Impact On Multistate Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. & COM. 799, 829 (1988);
Jennifer Howard, Alabama's New Collateral Source Rule: Observations From the Plaintiff's Perspective, 32
CUMB. L. REV. 573, 585-90 (2002); Gary T. Schwartz, A National Health Care Program: What Its Effect
Would Be On American Tort Law and Malpractice Law, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1339, 1343-44 (1994); see also
Guillermo G. Zorogastua, Comment, Improperly Divorced from Its Roots: The Rationales of the Collateral
Source Rule and Their Implications for Medicare and Medicaid Write-Offs, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 463-64
(2007); Linda J. Gobis, Note, Lambert v. Wrensch: Another Step Toward Abrogation of the Collateral Source
Rule in Wisconsin, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 857, 886-89 (1988); Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages]. But
see Christian D. Saine, Note, Preserving the Collateral Source Rule: Modern Theories of Tort Law and a
Proposal for Practical Application, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1997).
3. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1341-44.
4. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 829; Gobis, supra note 2, at 888.
5. See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1341-44; Gobis, supra note 2, at 888; see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 153-56, 166-72 (Yale Univ. Press
1986) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK]; Kenneth S. Abraham, Twenty-First-Century Insurance and
Loss Distribution in Tort Law, in EXPLORING TORT LAW (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) [hereinafter Abraham,
Twenty-First-Century Insurance].
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American accident law,"6 endures in the face of significant forces that would
appear to lead to its demise. This Article particularly focuses on the rule as
applied to collateral benefits that healthcare insurance companies pay for medical
damages caused by tortious injuries. These collateral benefits have been most
affected by tort reform and recent changes in health insurance regulation. The
endurance of the collateral source rule for these benefits is a by-product of the
fragmentation found in both the health insurance and tort systems in the United
States . The continued relevance of the rule, however, illustrates its normative
value to the current tort system in the United States.!
In the early 1990s, around the time President Clinton was elected to the
White House 9 and Hillary Clinton was appointed the chair of the White House
Task Force on National Healthcare Reform," many predicted the United States
would adopt some form of universal healthcare." During this period, and in the
shadow of the proposed universal healthcare plans of the early 1990s, Professor
Gary Schwartz predicted the abrogation of the collateral source rule and the
implementation of subrogation in its place." At around the same time, tort reform
advocates called for the abrogation of the rule." And indeed, the collateral source
rule has eroded over the past twenty years, particularly as a result of tort reform
legislation.' 4 Notably, during the past twenty years and as predicted by Professor
Schwartz, subrogation has grown as a part of the tort injury compensation
process. 5 Today, insurance companies providing compensation for healthcare to
6. John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1478,
1478 (1966).
7. See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS (Einer R.
Elhauge ed., 2010); Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets,
and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2010); see also Ellen S. Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation,
91 GEO. L.J. 659, 665 (2003) [hereinafter Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation]; Jack B. Weinstein, The
Restatements of Torts and the Courts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1439, 1443 (2001).
8. One scholar recently called the collateral source rule "tort's soul," due to the values underlying the
rule that are consistent with tort law as a whole. Michael I. Krauss & Jeremy Kidd, Collateral Source and Tort's
Soul, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1 (2009).
9. President's Task Force on National Health Care Reform, https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies
/president-s-task-force-on-national-health-care-reform (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
10. See HILLARY R. CLINTON, LIVING HISTORY 226 (Nan Graham ed., 2003); Rick Mayes, Universal
Coverage and the American Health Care System Crisis (Again), 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 242, 267-70
(2004).
11. See Paul Starr, What Happened to Health Care Reform?, AM. PROSPECT 20-31 (1995); see also
Derek Bok, The Great Health Care Debate of 1993-94, PUB. TALK: ONLINE J. OF DISCOURSE LEADERSHIP
(1998), http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/ptbok.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
12. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1341-44; see also Julie Davies, Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda, 25
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 119, 142-43 (2007).
13. Banks McDowell, The Collateral Source Rule: The American Medical Association and Tort Reform,
24 WASHBURN L.J. 205 (1985); L. Timothy Perrin, Comment, The Collateral Source Rule in Texas: Its
Impending Demise and a Proposed Modification, 18 TEX. TECH L.J. 961, 961 (1987); Gobis, supra note 2.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 95-119.
15. See discussion infra Part V.
966
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 43
their insured regularly include and enforce subrogation rights in their insurance
contracts. 6 This increase in the use and application of subrogation had a
significant effect on the collateral source rule. But rather than supplanting the
rule as predicted, subrogation has merely become intertwined with the collateral
source rule, further complicating and fragmenting this area of law.'7
Recent legislative actions to improve healthcare coverage and delivery of
health insurance to Americans created a new opportunity to eliminate or scale
back the collateral source rule and provide greater coherence and less
fragmentation in this area of the law. 8 The requirements under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act'9 (Affordable Care Act), particularly the
requirements mandating healthcare insurance for all U.S. citizens, 20 have
significant implications for the application of the collateral source rule. In the
1990s, scholars articulated that the collateral source rule, when applied to
medical expenses covered by health insurers, has less utility when there is
universal healthcare coverage, as is aspired to under the Affordable Care Act.' In
addition, federal legislation appears to permit subrogation in health insurance
plans, which also directly affects the utility of the collateral source rule.22 It is the
increased exercise of full subrogation, in combination with the potential for
16. Edward P. Hourihan & Kareen Zeitounzian, The Prognosis for Recovery: Health Insurance
Subrogation, 80 N.Y. ST. B. J. 22 (2008); J. Michael Hayes, Subrogation Rights of Health Care Providers, 78
N.Y. ST. B. J. 32 (2006); see also GARY L. WICKERT, ERISA AND HEALTH INSURANCE SUBROGATION IN ALL 50
STATES (4th ed. 2010).
17. See Schwartz v. Hasty, 175 S.W.3d 621, 626-27 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Joseph M. Perillo, The
Collateral Source Rule in Contract Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 705, 720 (2009) ("[S]ubrogation is often
critical to the application of the collateral source rule.").
18. See generally Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Tire Prospects for Public Health Reform, 39 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 312 (2011) ("PPACA was a missed opportunity to accomplish foundational health reform .... "); see
also Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, The Health Care Reform Act of 2010 and Medical
Malpractice Liability: Worlds in Collision or Ships Passing in the Night?, 64 SMU L. REV. 735 (2011) (arguing
PPACA was a missed opportunity for malpractice reform).
19. The Health Care Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 42 of the United States Code); see also The
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (amending, by
means of the reconciliation process, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and often pejoratively
referred to as "Obamacare"); see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Why I Will Never Be a Keynesian, 33 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 387, 397 (2010).
20. The Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act § 5000A (as amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010). Beginning in January 2014, failure to obtain and maintain minimum
essential health insurance coverage will result in a tax penalty. The penalty phases are during 2014 and 2015,
and become fully applicable in 2016. 8 JACOB MERTENS, MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
31B:34 (Carina Bryant ed., 2011).
21. Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1341-44; Jeffrey O'Connell et al., Blending Reform of Tort Liability and
Health Insurance: A Necessary Mix, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1306-09 (1994).
22. The excellent work of Kenneth S. Abraham makes this point cogently in Twenty-First-Century
Insurance, supra note 5, and THE LIABILITY CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA TO 9/11, at 203-07 (2008).
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universal coverage of health insurance, that lays the groundwork for the
fulfillment of the prophesies of Professor Schwartz and his cohorts.
The multipayer approach of the Affordable Care Act and multifaceted
legislation in the states related to subrogation, however, thwart the prophesies of
the rule's demise.23 The Affordable Care Act appears to leave the collateral
source rule unchanged despite the Act's otherwise sweeping changes to the
health insurance system and aspirations of providing universal healthcare
coverage to all Americans. 4 In addition, the Act, as currently designed, does not
ensure complete universal healthcare coverage for all citizens, but allows people
to choose to forgo coverage.25 The absence of universal coverage undermines
arguments supporting the predicted demise of the collateral source rule.26 The Act
also has a multipayer structure that allows the insured to contract for various
levels of insurance coverage, thereby implicating contractual, fairness, deterrent,
and other normative benefits accrued by continuing to impose the collateral
source rule.27 Finally, the Act does not resolve the conflicting and opposing
approaches to subrogation found in the various states." The restrictions on full
subrogation found in many jurisdictions allow the collateral source rule to
survive because the rule plays an important administrative and equitable function
in the determination of subrogation rights. 29 As such, the rule is particularly
important when full subrogation is prohibited or restricted.0
Today, despite significant legislative changes in healthcare insurance, tort
reform, and subrogation, the collateral source rule has remained in force in many
23. See infra text accompanying notes 133-51, 157-223.
24. The House of Representatives bill on healthcare reform, called the Affordable Care Act (House
Resolution 3962), did create a commission to establish standards for the coordination and subrogation of
benefits. H.R. 3962, 11 1th Cong. § 236 (2009). Representative John Barrow of Georgia and Representative
Bruce Braley of Iowa introduced amendments to restrict subrogation until a claimant was "made-whole." These
provisions were not included in the final bill. For a detailed outline of the aspirations and provisions of the
Affordable Care Act, see Key Features of the Law, HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov/law/
features/index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Kyle
Thomson, State-Run Insurance Exchanges in Federal Healthcare Reform: A Case Study in Dysfunctional
Federalism, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 548, 549 (2012) (noting the sweeping changes promulgated under the Act).
25. I.R.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2011). Those without coverage pay a tax penalty of the greater of $695
per year up to a maximum of three times that amount per family or 2.5% of household income. A penalty is
phased in according to following schedule: (a) flat fee: $95/2014; $325/2015; $695/2016; or (b) percentage: 1%
in 2014; 2% in 2015; 2.5% in 2016. Exemptions are granted for some situations such as financial hardship,
religious objections, if the lowest cost plan exceeds 8% of individuals' income, and those with incomes below
the tax filing threshold. For summaries of the Act, see Summary of New Health Reform Law, HENRY J. KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (last modified Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.kff.org/healthreformi/upload/8061 .pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 133-38.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 139-47.
28. See discussion infra Part V.
29. See discussion infra notes 177-214; infra note 193.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 207-10.
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jurisdictions even in the face of rising health insurance coStS.3' This Article
argues that as long as health insurance markets are fragmented, the collateral
source rule will continue to play an important normative role in the
administration of the tort injury compensation process. The rule also helps deter
tortious behavior, supports the insured's contractual expectations, is consistent
with distributive fairness, and ensures that those engaging in risky activities bear
the full cost of injuries. The collateral source will only lose its normative
imperative if and when the healthcare system becomes less fragmented, either
through a single-payer system or through other forms of federalization. 2
The Article begins in Part II by examining the background of and basis for
the collateral source rule. Subsequent sections examine three issues that have
recently affected the functioning of the collateral source rule: tort reform, health
insurance reform, and increased subrogation. Part III examines the impact of the
tort reform movement on the collateral source rule and concludes that tort reform
altered, but did not abrogate, the collateral source rule in most states. Part IV
looks at how recent changes in federal and state laws regarding health insurance
have impacted the collateral source rule. While these laws, particularly the
Affordable Care Act, undermine some of the rationales for the collateral source
rule, the changes in healthcare law have done little to change the rule itself. Part
V examines the rise of subrogation in U.S. health insurance practice. This rise
has had the largest impact on the collateral source rule, but the limitations on full
subrogation found in the laws of many states provide a continuing role for the
collateral source rule in calculating tort damages. The Article concludes by
acknowledging the enduring power of the collateral source rule as applied to
medical expenses covered by insurance and predicts the rule's continuing role in
the tort compensation process as long as the United States' healthcare insurance
and injury compensation systems remain fragmented.
11. THE BACKGROUND OF AND BASIS FOR THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE
The collateral source rule affects the amount of money a plaintiff may
receive in a tort action.33 It provides that the compensation received by an injured
plaintiff from a third party (usually an insurer) will not diminish any recovery
against the defendant-tortfeasor in a tort action.) Courts treat the collateral source
31. See infra note 193.
32. Jeffrey Coylewright, No Fault, No Worries... Combining a No-Fault Medical Malpractice Act with
a National Single-Payer Health Insurance Plan, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REv. 31, 57 (2007). Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.
33. Bushong v. Park, 837 A.2d 49, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
920A (1977)).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979) ("Payments made to or benefits conferred on
the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although they cover all or
part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.").
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rule as a rule of evidence and a substantive rule of law.35 It allows courts to
exclude evidence during a trial concerning collateral compensation36 and to
calculate damages once the trier of fact establishes liability.37 In the medical
insurance context, the collateral source rule allows a plaintiff to receive
compensation from her insurer for medical expenses related to her injuries and
receive cumulative compensation for the same economic damages from the
381tortfeasor.
The collateral source rule is rather abstruse as a legal rule, particularly when
viewed by a non-lawyer.39 Intuitively, a rule excluding evidence from the jury's
consideration and allowing a plaintiff to recover cumulative compensation seems
odd.4° But despite being called an "oddity, 4' and subject to considerable criticismsinc its" • 42
since its inception, the collateral source rule is well established and long
recognized under common law.43 The rule was first recognized in the United
States in 1854 in Propeller Monticello.44 In that case, the Court found the
35. Richard C. Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L.
REV. 669, 675 (1962); Richard C. Witzel, Jr., The Collateral Source Rule and State-Provided Special Education
and Therapy, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 697 (1997).
36. Both federal and state rules of evidence provide that evidence of the plaintiff being compensated by
a collateral source for all or a portion of the damages caused by the defendant's wrongful act is generally
inadmissible. FED. R. EVID. 403. As a rule of evidence, the rationale is that if a jury hears evidence of collateral
benefits, it will deduct these from the damage calculations. See Joel K. Jacobsen, The Collateral Source Rule
and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L. REV. 523, 525-26 (1991), cited in Witzel, Jr., supra note 35.
37. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979) (directing courts not to set off the
amount of damages recovered from a collateral source from the final judgment).
38. Michael F. Flynn, Private Medical Insurance and the Collateral Source Rule: A Good Bet?, 22 U.
TOL. L. REV. 39, 64-67 (1990); see also JACOB A. STEIN, 3 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 13:8
(Gerald W. Boston ed., 3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2011); Fleming, supra note 6, at 1478; J.D. Ghiardi, The
Collateral Source Rule: Multiple Recovery in Personal Injury Actions, 535 INS. L.J. 457, 460 (1967).
39. Matthew William Stevens, Strictly No Strict Liability: The 1995 Amendments to Chapter 99B, the
Products Liability Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2240, 2258 (1996).
40. Lee R. West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiffs Windfall, 16 OKLA. L.
REV. 395, 395 (1963); see also Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages, supra note 2, at 741.
41. Fleming, supra note 6; see also Zorogastua, supra note 2.
42. Fleming, supra note 6; Victor E. Schwartz, Tort Law Reform: Strict Liability and the Collateral
Source Rule Do Not Mix, 39 VAND. L. REV. 569, 570-71 (1986); Paul W. Pretzel, Do We Need the Collateral
Source Rule, 529 INS. L. J. 69 n.4 (1967); Charles W. Peckinpaugh, Jr., An Analysis of the Collateral Source
Rule, 524 INS. L.J. 545, 550 (1966) [hereinafter Peckinpaugh, Jr., An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule];
Charles W. Peckinpaugh, Jr., Is Collateral Source Outmoded?, 1965 A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. & COMP. L. PROC.
304 (1965); Douglas H. Schwartz, Comment, The Tortured Path of Ohio's Collateral Source Rule, 65 U. CIN.
L. REV. 643 (1997); Zorogastua, supra note 2.
43. See Mason v. Sainsbury, (1792) 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (K.B.) 3 Doug. 61; Clark v. Inhabitants of the
Hundred of Blythiny, (1823) 107 Eng. Rep. 378 (K.B.) 2 B. & C., 254; Yates v. Whyte, (1838) 132 Eng. Rep.
793 (K.B.) 4 Bing. (N.C.) 272; see also Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule
and Its Abolition: An Economic Perspective, 15 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 59 (2005).
44. Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152, 155 (1854); see also Haynes v. Yale-New Haven
Hosp., 699 A.2d 964, 977 (Conn. 1997); Bozeman v. Louisiana, 2003-1016, pp. 13-22 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d
692, 700-06. But see Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 525-26 (arguing the case is based on the "law of releases" and
not the collateral source rule-but many courts have interpreted the case to stand for the modern collateral
source rule); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 8, at 7-12.
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collateral payments made by an insurance company to the plaintiff cumulative to
the damages owed by the defendant since "[the contract with the insurer is in the
nature of a wager between third parties, with which the trespasser has no
concern. 45 After the Propeller case, states such as New York and Vermont
recognized the rule, and their courts provided similar justifications for
disregarding collateral benefits provided by insurance contracts when
determining tort damages.4
Since its early enshrinement, the collateral source rule has provoked
significant debate.4 These debates reflect disagreement about the collateral
source rule specifically and the nature and purpose of tort law in general.48
Indeed, the collateral source rule highlights the conflicting purposes of tort law .49
The justifications given for the collateral source rule, like the justifications for
other tort doctrines, are varied and inconsistent.0 The collateral source rule has
been both justified and attacked on the grounds of corrective justice, deterrence,
retribution, economic efficiency, instrumentalism, distributive justice, and
administrative efficiency.5 It is a combination or accumulation of these
justifications that drive most courts to either impose or, conversely, abrogate the
collateral source rule in tort liability actions,52 leading to an incoherent approach
to this doctrine in the United States.53
The collateral source rule is inconsistent with corrective or compensatory
notions of justice found in other areas of tort law.54 Corrective justice advocates,
45. Propeller Monticello, 58 U.S. at 155 ("This is a doctrine well established at common law and
received in courts of admiralty."); see also Yates, 132 Eng. Rep. 793; 2 WILLARD PHILLIPS, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF INSURANCE § 2163 (4th ed. 1854).
46. Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355, 358 (1860) (refusing to offset damages of the life insurance benefits);
Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536, 538 (1870) (refusing to allow insurance benefits received by a
plaintiff to be offset, absent legal privity between the defendant and insurer, because "[t]he policy of insurance
is collateral to the remedy against the defendant, and was procured solely by the plaintiff and at his expense,
and to the procurement of which the defendant was in no way contributory").
47. Krauss & Kidd, supra note 8, at 8; see also Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 64
(Cal. 1970); Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 527.
48. See Krauss & Kidd, supra note 8.
49. ld. ("How one [sees the collateral source rule] ... says much about the way one understands tort
law.").
50. Christopher J. Robinette, Torts Rationales, Pluralism, and Isaiah Berlin, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV.
329, 347 (2007); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) [hereinafter Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law].
51. See infra text accompanying notes 54-97.
52. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (applying the collateral source rule
citing deterrent, instrumental, realist, and fairness rationales); see also Helfend, 465 P.2d at 63-65.
53. Goldsmith, supra note 2; Nora J. Pasman-Green & Ronald D. Richards Jr., Who is Winning the
Collateral Source Rule War? The Battleground in the Sixth Circuit States, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 425, 427 (2000);
Ellen S. Pryor, Part of the Whole: Tort Law's Compensatory Failures Through a Wider Lens, 27 REV. LITIG.
307,319-20 (2008).
54. C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513 (2003); Scott Hershovitz, Harry
Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2010); Jason Solomon, Equal Accountability
Through Tort Law, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1765, 1791, 1805-11 (2009).
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who view tort law as designed to "make the injured party whole,"55 object to the
collateral source rule because it requires the tortfeasor to pay certain damages56 le-5
despite the plaintiff already being compensated for those injuries. This double-
recovery scenario creates a situation where the plaintiff is put in a better position
than before the tort occurred, thereby conflicting with the compensatory function
of tort law.5" Thus, the potential for cumulative compensation under the rule
encourages plaintiffs to bring lawsuits where they might not do so otherwise.
Under these corrective notions of tort law, damages are supposed "to return
the plaintiff as closely as possible to his or her condition before the accident."'59
However, tort law is particularly inconsistent on this point; thus, corrective
critiques of the collateral source rule are weak. For example, tort damages are
usually divided between economic, noneconomic, and punitive damages.6' While
economic damages come closest to achieving the "make-whole" ideal of tort
compensation, under corrective norms, noneconomic damages do not, due to
their imprecision and ethereal nature. 2 Likewise, punitive damages, intended for
deterrence and retribution, are clearly not designed to make the plaintiff whole.6
Allowing overcompensation by way of the collateral source rule is no more
55. Gary J. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law, supra note 50, at 1801; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 709-33 (2003); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND
FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 16-20 (3d ed. 2007).
56. See Gobis, supra note 2.
57. id. (citing West, supra note 40); see also Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages, supra note 2, at
741.
58. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 803 ("[T]he collateral source rule encourages a plaintiff to litigate rather
than to accept what he already received as payment.").
59. "The fundamental goal of damage awards in the unintentional tort area is to return the plaintiff as
closely as possible to his or her condition before the accident." MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT
LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 689 (7th ed. 2001); see also Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St. 3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362,
857 N.E.2d 1195 ("The collateral-source rule is an exception to the general rule that in a tort action, the measure
of damages is that which will compensate and make the plaintiff whole."); Laura Dietz et al., 22 AM JUR. 2D
Damages § 28 (2007) ("The sole object of compensatory damages is to make the injured party whole for losses
actually suffered .... "); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) (stating compensatory damages are
intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful
conduct).
60. Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian
(But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2006); John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort
Law, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1221 (2008); Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the
Goals of Tort Law, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 163 (2004); Pryor, Rehabilitating Tort Compensation, supra note 7.
61. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.77 (West 2011) (requiring the verdict in all tort cases be itemized
into separate categories for economic losses, noneconomic losses, and punitive damages).
62. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Twisting the Purpose of Pain and Suffering Awards: Turning
Compensation into "Punishment", 54 S.C. L. REV. 47, 60 (2002); Martin V. Totaro, Note, Modernizing the
Critique of Per Diem Pain and Suffering Damages, 92 VA. L. REv. 289, 310 (2006).
63. Avihay Dorfman, What Is the Point Of the Tort Remedy?, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 105, 142 (2010);
Zipursky, supra note 55, at 710-13 (criticizing corrective justice theorists for their failure to accommodate
punitive damages within their preferred, make-whole picture of the tort remedy).
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offensive to corrective notions of tort law than awarding an injured party
noneconomic and punitive damages.
In comparison, the collateral source rule is consistent with concepts of
deterrence, retribution, and economic efficiency advocated by tort theorists. One
of the primary justifications for the collateral source rule is ensuring that the
defendant pay the full measure of damages for his tortious behavior. 64 If collateral
payments made by third-party insurers reduced a defendant's liability rather than
requiring the defendant to pay the full amount of damages, the result would be
under-deterrence from engaging in tortious behavior. Plaintiff's insurance
would, in effect, subsidize the defendant's tortious behavior.
The collateral source rule also receives support under law-and-economics
notions of efficiency. 66 The collateral source rule causes the defendant-tortfeasor
to pay the full cost of his risk-taking activities. Law-and-economics scholars
point out that if a tortfeasor is not liable for the damages he causes, he will over-
engage in that activity. 67 Full compensation deters not just injury-causing
behavior by making it more costly, but also helps actors achieve the "optimal
scale of activity" that balances risk-taking activity with its true cost.68 The only
way the true cost can be determined is by requiring the tortfeasor to pay the full
measure of damages. 69 Reducing a tortfeasor's damages, in the absence of the
collateral source rule, requires the plaintiff to subsidize the defendant's injurious
and tortious behavior."
64. Fleming, supra note 6, at 1483; Perrin, supra note 13, at 989.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901A (1977) (listing "deterrence of tortfeasor" as one
purpose of the tort system); see also Michael B. Kelly, What Makes the Collateral Source Rule Different?, 39
AKRON L. REV. 1171 (2006) (discussing Paul H. Rubin & Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental
Deaths, 50 J.L. & ECON. 221, 221 (2007)).
66. Traditional law-and-economics legal analysis considers whether a particular law will maximize
"social welfare" or "efficiency"-generally defined as "overall wealth maximization of a society." A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10 (2d ed. 1989) (stating law-and-
economics theory concentrates on the "efficiency" of legal rules, with efficiency defined as "the relationship
between the aggregate benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situation"); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2-3 (2004); ANTHONY OGUS, COSTS AND CAUTIONARY
TALES: ECONOMIC INSIGHTS FOR THE LAW 27 (2006).
67. Robert A. Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing: When Charitable Gifts Augment Victim Compensation,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 547, 563 (2003); Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 43, at 70 (arguing for retention of the
collateral source rule as a means of deterrence); J. Moorhouse et al., Law & Economics and Tort Law: A Survey
of Scholarly Opinion, 62 ALB. L. REV. 667, 688 (1998) (stating that the main justification of the collateral-
source rule is that "tortfeasors must pay the full costs of their actions"); Saine, supra note 2, at 1080.
68. Saine, supra note 2, at 1080.
69. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 90 (1987);
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 310 (4th ed. 2004) ("[E]fficiency theorists to endorse
compensation to tort victims only up to the point where the marginal utility of the victim's wealth pre- and post-
injury are equal;"); see also, e.g., David Friedman, What Is "Fair Compensation" for Death and Injury?, 2
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81, 82-85 (1982) ("Any transfer of money from uninjured defendants to injured
plaintiffs beyond that point is 'inefficient."'); see also Saine, supra note 2, at 1079.
70. See Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2005) (Garth, J., dissenting);
Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
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Concurrent with the notion of deterrence and optimal cost allocation are the
moral notions of retribution that underlie the justification of the collateral source
rule. 7 1 Notions of fairness and justice favor the defendant-tortfeasor paying for all
of the damages of his tortious behavior and not receiving the benefits of
collateral source compensation provided to the plaintiff by an insurance policy.
72
Some courts and scholars state that it would not be "fair" for the defendant to
benefit from the plaintiff's insurance policy, particularly if the plaintiff has
acquired and paid for the policy herself. In addition, some invoke Solomonic
fairness rationales, arguing between allowing the plaintiff to receive too much or
the defendant to pay too little, it is better to err on the side of paying the plaintiff
too much.74 This fairness rationale is amplified when factoring in the plaintiffs
attorney's fees and the imprecision of the damage award process which can lead
to the under-compensation of injured plaintiffs.75
Instrumental rationales also support the collateral source rule. Instrumentalist
arguments posit that the collateral source rule encourages the purchase of and
76promotes the benefits from insurance. These rationales are frequently cited
reasons for applying the rule.7 While this rationale for the rule remains cogent
275, 312 (2001); Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 43, at 70 ("When the plaintiff is covered by medical
insurance and defendant has liability insurance, the absence of the collateral source rule causes the health
insurers to subsidize the liability insurers.").
71. Fleming, supra note 6, at 1544; Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability
Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 327 (1990). But see Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the
Common Law of Tons: A Descriptive Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 231 (2006) ("[T]he presumed link
between the collateral source rule and retribution is dubious.").
72. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 800-01; James P. Moceri & John L. Messina, Collateral Source
Rule in Personal Injury Litigation, 7 GONZ. L. REV. 310, 327-28 (1972); see also Berry v. Dewey, 172 P. 27,
29-30 (Kan. 1918) (not applying collateral source rule would not be "sound, legal, equitable, or fair"); Condon
v. Hathaway, 740 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
73. See, e.g., Smith v. Indus. Constructors, Inc., 783 F.2d 1249. 1255 (5th Cir. 1986).
74. See, e.g., Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734,
739 (N.C. 1987); Robert A. Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing: When Charitable Gifts Augment Victim
Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 547, 565 (2003); Moceri & Messina, supra note 72, at 310; Witzel, Jr.,
supra note 35, at 709.
75. Note, Unreasoh in the Law of Damages, supra note 2, at 741-42; Note, California's Collateral
Source Rule and Plaintiff's Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 667, 667 (1986).
76. For a description of instrumentalism, see Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism: Using
Dworkin's Principle-Rule Distinction to Reconceptualize Metaphorically a Substance-Procedure Dissonance
Exemplified by Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in International Product Injury Cases, 87 MARQ. L. REV.
425 (2004). "[1]instrumentalists build their approach to the law around questions such as the following: 'What
social value does the rule of liability further in this case?' Id. at 523 n.3 (quoting George P. Fletcher, Fairness
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 538 (1972)); see also R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982).
77. Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1970) ("The collateral source rule as
applied here embodies the venerable concept that a person who has invested years of insurance premiums to
assure his medical care should receive the benefits of his thrift .... The collateral source rule expresses a policy
judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and for other
eventualities."); see also Brown v. Am. Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1980); Haischer v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 848 A.2d 620 (Md. 2004); Bozeman v. Louisiana, 2003-1016 (La. 712/04); 879 So. 2d 692,
704 (arguing the collateral source rule encourages citizens to purchase insurance); Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins.
Co., 07-1335 (La. 4/18/08); 980 So. 2d 654, 668; Indus. Constructors, Inc., 783 F.2d at 1255 ("[I]t encourages
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for certain forms of insurance, such as life and disability policies, it is less
forceful in the medical insurance context.78 In addition, the ubiquity of
government-provided health insurance, employer and government subsidization
of health insurance, and impending insurance purchase mandates, have
diminished the incentive-based justifications for the collateral source rule in the
medical insurance context. 9
Arguments sounding in contract law have also been used to justify the
collateral source rule, particularly in the insurance context.0 Indeed, contract law
was the underlying policy of many early English and American collateral source
rule cases. 8' The contract-based argument for the collateral source rule is
supported by the belief that the plaintiff deserves to reap the "benefit of the
bargain" by contracting with the insurance company." Allowing a tortfeasor to
benefit from an injured party's insurance contract contravenes the contract
principles of promoting the contracting parties' intent 3 and limiting third-party
beneficiary rights.r
Some courts have justified the collateral source rule on administrative
efficiency grounds, particularly in ruling on evidentiary matters during a tort
potential victims to buy insurance."); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 152-53 (2d ed.
1977). But see Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 533 n.46 (calling the rationale "silly").
78. See Gobis, supra note 2, at 860, 865-67.
79. See Bozeman, 879 So. 2d at 701-05; Paula Hearn Moore et al., Applying the Collateral Source Rule
to Government Mandated Programs, 15 J. LEG. ECoN. 31 (2008); see also infra text accompanying notes 133-
38.
80. See Klein v. United States, 339 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1964); Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S,
333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964); McKay v. Town of West Seneca, 381 N.Y.S.2d 892, 896 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd.
on dissent, 41 N.Y.2d 931, 394 N.Y.S.2d 637, 363 N.E.2d 361; Carroll v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville
Centre, 271 N.Y.S.2d 7 (App. Div. 1966), aff d. 19 N.Y.2d 658, 278 N.Y.S.2d 626, 225 N.E.2d 217;
Zorogastua, supra note 2, at 475-76 (discussing the benefits of the bargain approach).
81. It has been noted that the decision in Propeller Monticello may have turned on the principle known
as the "law of releases." Krauss & Kidd, supra note 8, at 9. If the Court had permitted a reduction in plaintiff's
tort award by the amount of insurance proceeds received, it would be treating the insurer as a joint tortfeasor. Id.
Instead, the Court invoked contract principles, recognizing "[t]he contract with the insurer is in the nature of a
wager between third parties." Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152, 155 (1854). Contract principles
also drove early English collateral source cases. Yates v. Whyte, (1838) 132 Eng. Rep. 793, 794 (K.B.) 4 Bing.
(N.C.) 272 ("Plaintiff's contract with the underwriters is res inter alios acta of which the Defendants cannot
avail themselves."), cited in Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 43, at 62.
82. See Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 43, at 62-65; Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 525-26; West, supra
note 40.
83. Of paramount importance in interpreting a contract is ascertaining the intent of the parties. See
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Penn. 1983). It would be hard to
argue that an insured intended, under her insurance policy, to allow her insurance compensation to decrease the
amounts awarded in a lawsuit by tortious defendants. As discussed infra, however, there is a compelling
argument that an insured, when purchasing an insurance policy, is doing so for the purpose of receiving
"prompt and sure payments without the necessity of litigation and without regard to the liability and financial
resources of prospective defendants." Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages, supra note 2, at 75 1.
84. See generally Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third-Party
Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985); David M. Summers, Note, Third Party Beneficiaries and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 880 (1982).
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trial.85 Calculating damages can be difficult, particularly when an insurance
policy contains certain exclusions, co-payment requirements, complicated
86
specialist rules, and negotiated discounts with certain medical providers. A
jury's calculation of damages can be made much easier when the intricacies of
collateral benefits are excluded from consideration by the jury and reserved forS 87 I diin h
consideration by the judge in post-verdict proceedings. In addition, the misuse
of evidence of collateral benefits by the jury and its potential prejudicial impact
leads some courts to exclude them.8
The final rationale provided in favor of the collateral source rule is based on
the distributive justice and realist arguments that plaintiffs are often
undercompensated in the final outcome of a torts trial, particularly when taking
into account the cost of court expenses and attorneys' fees.8 9 Under this rationale,
plaintiffs' extra compensation resulting from the collateral source rule acts as an
equalizer in the tort judicial process, leveling an uneven field in order to fully
85. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 803; Peckinpaugh, Jr., An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule,
supra note 42, at 551; Witzel, Jr., supra note 35, at 699.
86. Law v. Griffith, 930 N.E.2d 126 (Mass. 2010); Ty A. Patton, Common Sense and the Common Law,
They're Not as Common as They Used to Be: A Critique of the Kansas Supreme Court's New Application of the
Collateral Source Rule [Martinez v. Milburn Enterprises, Inc., 233 P.3d 205 (Kan. 2010)], 50 WASHBURN L.J.
537, 538 (2011) ("[T]he Court's decision to introduce into evidence medical bills of vastly different amounts
likely will result in additional confusion for juries and for both plaintiff and defense counsel as they wrestle
with the 'reasonable' cost of medical care."); see also Hoffman v. Brandt, 421 P.2d 425, 429-30 (Cal. 1966);
Garfield v. Russell, 59 Cal. Rptr. 379, 382 (Ct. App. 1967); Blake Hamm, Comment, A Dysfunctional Statute
and Its "Plain Meaning " Kill Off the Collateral Source Rule in Texas, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 229, 233 (2009) ("To
permit the defendant to tell the jury that the plaintiff has been recompensed by a collateral source for his
medical costs might irretrievably upset the complex, delicate, and somewhat indefinable calculations which
result in the normal jury verdict.").
87. See Gore v. Faye, 253 S.W.3d 785, 789 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). But see Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633
N.E.2d 504, 510 (Ohio 1994) (finding that the post-verdict deduction of collateral benefits impermissibly
violated the "plaintiff s right to have all facts determined by the jury, including damages"); Narayen v. Bailey,
747 A.2d 195, 201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
Some states permit collateral source evidence to be introduced during trial, while Maryland and
others permit introduction of such evidence only in post-verdict proceedings. In Alaska, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, and
Pennsylvania, mandatory reduction of compensatory damages by collateral source payments is
permitted under certain circumstances. In Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Georgia,
Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington state,
discretionary reduction is permitted. In many states, however, a plaintiff is permitted to present
evidence of the cost of obtaining collateral source benefits as a set off against a portion of such
reductions. This enables a plaintiff to recover costs such as insurance premiums.
Narayen, 747 A.2d at 201.
88. See Eichel v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 255 (1963); Bennett v. Haley, 208 S.E.2d 302, 312
(Ga. Ct. App. 1974); Martinez v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 243 (Kan. 2010) (Davis, C.J., dissenting);
Scott v. Garfield, 912 N.E.2d 1000, 1009-10 (Mass. 2009); Cates v. Wilson, 361 S.E.2d 734, 739 (N.C. 1987).
89. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1973); Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
(noting that attorney's fees reduced victim's compensation); Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61,
68 (Cal. 1970). It has been noted that "[s]uch a validation of the CSR would also be an implicit approval of the
abandonment of the American Rule for recovery of lawyer's fees." Krauss & Kidd, supra note 8, at 22 n.124
(citing Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 805-08).
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compensate injured plaintiffs. 9° Critics characterize this justification of the rule as
misguided because it seeks to remedy the tort system's shortcomings through the
oblique and confusing mechanism of the collateral source rule.9'
Overall, the intuitive appeal of the corrective-justice concern of
overcompensation, combined with the often inconsistent plurality of
justifications for the collateral source rule, make the rule an easy target of scorn
and attack by its opponents. 92 Indeed, tort reform advocates have successfully
rolled back the rule for these reasons.93 Nevertheless, when viewed as a whole,
the rationales favoring the rule outweigh those against it, particularly in the
health insurance context.94 The majority of courts favor overcompensation of the
plaintiffs through the collateral source rule over allowing defendants to escape
liability for the full measure of their damages. 9 In addition, as discussed below,
post-verdict application of subrogation has rectified concerns of
overcompensation of plaintiffs when the collateral source rule is applied.96
Finally, the collateral source rule plays an important administrative role that
favors its application in determining damages, particularly when used in
conjunction with subrogation.97
III. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN THE FACE OF "TORT REFORM"
In the past twenty years, the collateral source rule came under the greatest
scrutiny by tort reform advocates. 9 "Tort reform"99 is a label that captures a
90. See Helfend, 465 P.2d at 68 (noting the plaintiff rarely experiences "double recovery" as juries are
unaware of the large portion that goes to the plaintiff's attorney in contrast to the favorable tax treatment of
personal injury damages for defendants).
91. See Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 534 (arguing the collateral source rule should not disguise an attempt
to reject the rule that each party bear their own attorney's fees).
92. See Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 43, at 61 ("[T]he 'windfall' argument has nonetheless
prevailed in that it has driven the recent state tort-reform initiatives seeking to abolish the collateral source
rule."); Krauss & Kidd, supra note 8, at 11-12 ("In the absence of a coherent theoretical defense of the CSR,
legislators have been sensitive to criticism of the rule.").
93. See Krauss & Kidd, supra note 8, at 11-12.
94. See Flynn, supra note 38, at 64-65.
95. See infra note 193. A majority of jurisdictions recognize some form of the collateral source rule. 3
STEIN, supra note 38, § 19:34; Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule:
Seeking Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 211 (2009).
96. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 2; McDowell, supra note 13; Jamie L. Wershbale, Tort Reform in
America: Abrogating the Collateral Source Rule Across the States, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 346 (2008).
99. Some who questioned the changes proposed by these particular interest groups challenged the use of
the term "reform" in relation to these measures that could also be viewed as making the tort system more
inequitable. Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle over Tort Reform and the Overlooked Legacy of the Progressives,
39 AKRON L. REV. 943, 944 n.2 (2006); see also Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Effect of "Tort Reform" on Tort
Case Filings, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 559, 559 n.1 (2009) ("1 do not believe that most [tort reform] efforts meet the
classic definition of 'reform' as '[a] change for the better; an improvement[,]' at least in the absence of
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political movement in the United States that sought to limit lawsuits, particularly
personal injury suits.'" Championed by corporate, business, and insurance
advocates, much of the reform sought directly benefited the interests of these
constituents. '°' For example, these advocates sought such measures as capping
noneconomic and punitive damages, limiting class actions, narrowing traditional
joint-and-several-liability rules, requiring pre-filing expert affidavits in tort cases,
and abolishing the collateral source rule.' °2 Advocates for these measures argued
that their proposed changes would especially help decrease liability insurance
103premiums.
Because the collateral source rule apparently "overcompensates" plaintiffs
and provides a financial incentive for plaintiffs to bring an action, tort reform
advocates who sought to limit the number and size of awards favored abolition of
the rule.'0 '
Tort reform measures that were taken by legislatures, including the rolling
back of the collateral source rule, were typically piecemeal.0 5 And while perhaps
responsive to certain special interests, these reforms were not considerate of any
consistent theory of tort liability.'06 Indeed, the economists David Schap and
Andrew Feeley's study of the collateral source rule in 2006 concluded that the
efforts to reform the rule during this period were "driven by the relative political
clout of various special interests in different times and places."
' °0 7
In response to these tort reform efforts, many states changed the collateral
source rule from its common law form. Thirty-nine states enacted statutes that
universal health care and an improved social safety net.").
100. See Davies, supra note 12, at 131-32; F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the "Tort
Reform" Movement. 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 469-83 (2006); John T. Nockelby, How to Manufacture a
Crisis: Evaluating Empirical Claims Behind "Tort Reform ", 86 OR. L. REV. 533, 534 (2007); Robert S. Peck et
al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 397 (2000); Janutis, supra
note 99, at 944.
101. Janutis, supra note 99, at 944; Peck et al., supra note 100, at 397. But see AM. TORT REFORM
Ass'N, http:l/www.atra.org/aboutl (last visited Aug. 19, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
102. Hubbard, supra note 100, at 469-83; THE ATRA TORT REFORM RECORD (June 28, 2012),
available at http:llwww.atra.orglsitesldefault/ftles/documentslrecord%207-1-12_- O.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM: EVIDENCE FROM
THE STATES (2004), available at http:/lwww.cbo.gov/sites/defaultlfileslcbofiles/ftpdocs/55xx
/doc5549/report.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing different reforms and evaluating the
difficulty of comparing tort reforms across the states).
103. Ronen Avraham & Max Schanzenbach, The Impact of Tort Reform on Private Health Insurance
Coverage, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 319, 320 (2010); Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance,
and Tort Reform, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 564 (2011); see also Thompson v. KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773, 779-
80 (Kan. 1993).
104. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 803.
105. Davies, supra note 12, at 130-31; Elaine W. Shoben, Let the Damages Fit the Wrong: An Immodest
Proposal for Reforming Personal Injury Damages, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006).
106. Shoben, supra note 105.
107. David Schap & Andrew Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule: Statutory Reform and Special
Interests, 28 CATO J. 83, 89 tbl. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Schap & Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule].
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modified or abrogated the rule.' °8 According to the most recent surveys,
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming retain the rule in its
pure, unmodified form.'0 9 States that modified the rule typically enacted
legislation that abrogated the rule when the tort award resulted from a medical
malpractice claim. "0
Remarkably, despite the severe criticism of and significant campaigns to
repeal the collateral source rule, only six states have legislation completely
abrogating the rule,"' at least during the post-verdict damages determination."12 A
few states passed legislation attempting to abrogate the rule, but courts struck
these measures down as unconstitutional."
3
While tort reform as a political movement purportedly sought to improve the
tort process, efforts to limit or abrogate the collateral source rule did not provide
coherence to the tort system. "4 Rather, they created greater fragmentation and
inconsistency."5 For example, after tort reform legislation was enacted in some
states, applying the collateral source rule became contingent on whether the tort
108. Schap & Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule, supra note 107, at 89 (survey conducted in 2006); see
also Benjet, supra note 95, at 214 (finding forty-two jurisdictions have "enacted and retained some form of
statute that restricts the collateral source rule"); Zorogastua, supra note 2, at 463-64 (Thirty-eight states had
modified or abrogated the rule.).
109. See Cara Hanson, Ohio's Collateral Source Rule, 40 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 711, 720-21 (2009);
Zorogastua, supra note 2, at 463 n.3; see also Benjet, supra note 95, at 210.
110. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.548 (2010); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2003); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3333.1 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (West 1974 & Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.76 (West 2011); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1205 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. §
147.136 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 60G (West 2000); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819
(2010); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545(a) (MCKINNEY 2009 & Supp. 2012); R.I. GEN LAWS ANN. § 9-19-34.1 (West
1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-12 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-119 (West 2000); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78B-3-405 (West 1953 & Supp. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.080 (West 2007); see also 3 STEIN,
supra note 38, § 19:34; David Schap & Andrew Feeley, (Much) More on the Collateral Source Rule, Coll. of
Holy Cross Dep't of Econ. Faculty Research Series, Paper No. 06-05, available at http://www.holycross.edu/
departments/ economics/RePEc/SchapCollateral 1.pdf [hereinafter Schap & Feeley, (Much) More] (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
111. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.070; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.76; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36 (West 2010); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 4545 (MCKINNEY 2009); see also Schap & Feeley, (Much) More, supra note 110; 3 STEIN, supra note
38, § 19:34.
112. See discussion infra note 207.
113. See, e.g., Farley v. Engelken, 740 P.2d 1058, 1068 (Kan. 1987) (holding that Kansas' abrogation of
the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases violated equal protection); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d
825, 838 (N.H. 1980) (abrogating collateral source rule violated equal protection); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 137 (N.D. 1978) (abrogating collateral source rule violated due process); see also Thompson v.
KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773, 782 (Kan. 1993); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715
N.E.2d 1062, 1089-90 (Ohio 1999); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 512-13 (Ohio 1994).
114. Avraham & Schanzenbach, supra note 103, at 320; Geistfeld, supra note 103, at 565; Goldsmith,
supra note 2 (noting that the disparate application of the collateral source rule is particularly troublesome);
Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 43, at 62.
115. Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 43, at 62.
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action was for malpractice, or where the insurer explicitly reserved subrogation
rights in the insurance policy."16 Some of these states' highest courts recognized
the fragmentation, striking down the reforms on account of their arbitrary
treatment of the collateral source rule." 1
7
In theory, abrogation of the collateral source rule holds the promise of
simplifying and reforming the tort process for the better. Tort reform efforts that
seek to lower costs, simplify litigation, and standardize the tort and healthcare
compensation systems, would benefit from the abrogation of the collateral source
rule but only as part of a comprehensive reform of health insurance and
subrogation rules. In a fragmented system, both tort and health insurance reform,
in the sense of lower costs and more effective results, are thwarted."8
Incoherency and fragmentation of the law increase the cost of both the tort
system and health insurance." 9 As long as these areas of the law remain
fragmented and incoherent, however, the collateral source rule will endure
because the rule provides administrative, deterrent, instrumentalist, and other
important functions under a multipayer health insurance system.
IV. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN THE FACE OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT AND THE DRIVE FOR UNIVERSAL HEALTHCARE
Tort reform advocates voiced similar concerns as advocates of changes to
healthcare insurance in the United States. 120 While usually on the other end of the
political spectrum, healthcare reform advocates, like tort reform advocates,
116. Schap & Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule, supra note 107, at 89-90; Schap & Feeley, (Much)
More, supra note 110.
117. Denton v. Con-Way S. Exp., Inc., 402 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 1991) (disapproved of on other grounds by,
Grissom v. Gleason, 418 S.E.2d 27 (Ga. 1992)); Thompson v. KFB Ins. Co., 850 P.2d 773 (Kan. 1993).
118. See Einer Elhauge, Why We Should Care About Health Care Fragmentation and How to Fix It, in
THE FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (Einer R. Elhuage ed., 2010); Hoffman, supra note 7 (discussing
health insurance reform in a fragmented insurance market); see also M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health
Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 288 (2003); Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 377 (2006); Peter Hammer, Competition and Quality as Dynamic Processes in
the Balkans of American Health Care, 1 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 473, 473 (2006); Pryor, Rehabilitating
Tort Compensation, supra note 7, at 665 (noting the rising fragmentation in the tort compensation process).
119. See David A. Hyman, Health Care Fragmentation: We Get What We Pay For, in THE
FRAGMENTATION OF U.S. HEALTH CARE (Einer R. Elhuage ed., 2010) (discussing the effects of a fragmented
healthcare system on insurance costs); Michelle M. Mello et al., Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient
Safety, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 375, 388-91 (2005) (discussing the interplay between "tort liability and
patient safety"); see also Geistfeld, supra note 103, at 539 (arguing that uncertainty in tort system leads to
higher costs).
120. See, e.g., Jean Connolly Carmalt, Holding the U.S. Accountable: How American Health Care Fails
to Meet International Human Rights Standards, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 359, 389-99 (2008); Andr6 Hampton,
Markets, Myths, and a Man on the Moon: Aiding and Abetting America's Flight from Health Insurance, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 987, 996 (2000); James B. Roche, Health Care in America: Why We Need Universal Health
Care and Why We Need It Now, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1013, 1023 (2001); Scott D. Litman, Note, Health
Care Reform for the Twenty-First Century: The Need for a Federal and State Partnership, 7 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 871 (1998).
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decried the high cost of insurance, the inadequacies of the tort process, and the
effect of these two systems on consumers and businesses alike.'2 '
Efforts to reform the healthcare system in the 1990s under President Clinton
were unsuccessful, but the 2008 election of President Obama revived those
efforts.' 22 And, in 2010, Congress passed significant legislation reforming health
insurance in the form of the Affordable Care Act.2 3 Among the most important
components of this legislation are "mandates,"'24 effective in 2014, requiring all
U.S. citizens to carry health insurance, and concurrent requirements of large
employers to offer coverage to employees. 121
This federal legislation followed on the heels of legislative reforms in states
such as Massachusetts, 26 Hawaii,' 27 Maine,' 28 and Vermont,' 29 which imposed
similar legislative mechanisms to provide healthcare coverage to all residents.'3°
While the federal and state legislative reforms sought to lower the cost of
121. See Randolph I. Gordon & Brook Assefa, A Tale of Two Initiatives: Where Propaganda Meets Fact
in the Debate Over America's Health Care, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 693, 698 (2006) ("In the face of the
gathering [health care crises] ... it is no small source of wonder that the modern debate respecting health care
reform so often devolves into arguments concerning.., changes in... tort law.").
122. See Mark A. Peterson, It Was a Different Time: Obama and the Unique Opportunity for Health
Care Reform, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 429, 435-36 (2011) (discussing differences in the political climate
when Clinton tackled healthcare reform in the early 1990s as compared to when Obama entered office in 2009).
123. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). For a
summary of the Act, see Overview of Health Care Reform, WHITE HOUSE, http://www. whitehouse.gov/health-
care-meeting/proposal/whatsnew/overview (last visited July 10, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Low Review).
The central provisions of the Affordable Care Act were upheld as constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
124. The term "mandate" has been complicated in light of National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius, where Justice Roberts's plurality opinion found the Affordable Care Act's requirement to purchase
insurance to be enforceable under the Constitution as a tax, but not as a "mandate." See 132 S. Ct. at 2566.
125. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1501-11.
126. David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 55 KAN. L.
REV. 1103, 1115-17 (2007); MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM: THREE YEARS LATER, HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7777-02.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
127. HAw. REV. STAT. § 393-1 to -51 (West 1993 & Supp. 2009). The Prepaid Healthcare Act requires
nearly all employers to provide health insurance to their employees who work twenty hours or more a week for
four consecutive weeks. Id. § 393-3(8), -14.
128. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 6901-15 (Supp. 2011). The Dirigo Health Reform Act arranges
for "comprehensive, affordable health care coverage" on a voluntary basis. Id. § 6902.
129. Health Care Affordability Act, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 191, available at http:/l
www.leg.state.vt.us/DOCS/2006/ACTS/ACT19I.DOC (last visited Feb. 28, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (providing affordable coverage for the uninsured by focusing on management of chronic care and
affordability).
130. See Roger Stark, What Works and What Doesn't: A Review of Health Care Reform in the States,
WASH. POL'Y CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE (Aug. 2008), http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/sites/default/files/
StateHealthCareReforms.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Moving Toward
Comprehensive Health Care Reform, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & UNINSURED, http://www.kff.org/
uninsured/kcmustatehealthreform.cfm (last visited Jan. 24, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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healthcare insurance for consumers, none of the legislation included any
provisions dealing with the collateral source rule.'3'
The recent state initiatives and the federal insurance reforms and mandates
provide some support for abrogating the collateral source rule, but the way
legislation on the federal and state levels is structured and insurance is provided
to consumers, the collateral source rule remains valid as a normative rule of law.
As a result, the rule endures in most jurisdictions despite the significant changes
in the health insurance laws. 132
The new federal healthcare legislation and similar state healthcare initiatives
potentially undermine the collateral source rule in three ways. First, they
undermine the instrumentalist rationale, which claims that the collateral source
rule provides incentives and rewards for the purchase of insurance. 3 1 While one
scholar ridiculed this rationale, 34 other scholars and judges notably put forward
the instrumental rationale as a legitimate basis for allowing the plaintiff to be
awarded cumulative recovery against the defendant.'35 Some judges aver that the
plaintiff-insured's "foresight" in purchasing insurance should be rewarded.' 36 The
new federal legislation clearly undermines the foresight rationale. The Affordable
Care Act requires all U.S. citizens to purchase health insurance and expands
coverage significantly through employer-based policies. 37 Thus, the incentive
131. A number of these states did, however, abrogate the collateral source rule in medical malpractice
actions. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906(2) (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60G(a) (2000);
WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080 (2007). A subrogation provision was also considered as part of the Affordable
Care Act but did not get included in the final bill. See The Attack On Subrogation Continues: Amendment to
Obama Care Bill Contains Anti-Subrogation Trojan Horse, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C. (Aug. 6,
2009), http://www.mwl-law.com/CM/Newsletters/SubroAlert-8-6-09.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
132. Only six states have enacted legislation completely abrogating the collateral source rule. See
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.17.070 (West 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a (West 2011); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 768.76 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.36
(West 2010); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545 (MCKINNEY 2009); see also Schap & Feeley, (Much) More, supra note 110; 3
STEIN, supra note 38, § 19:34.
133. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
134. Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 533 n.46 (calling the rationale "silly").
135. See, e.g., Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1970) ("The collateral source
rule as applied here embodies the venerable concept that a person who has invested years of insurance
premiums to assure his medical care should receive the benefits of his thrift .... The collateral source rule
expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal
injuries and for other eventualities."); see also Brown v. Am. Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 934
(Tex. 1980); Haischer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 848 A.2d 620 (Md. 2004); Bozeman v. Louisiana, 2003-1016 (La.
7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 704 (arguing the collateral source rule encourages citizens to purchase insurance);
Bellard v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 07-1335 (La. 4/18/08); 980 So. 2d 654, 668; Smith v. Indus. Constructors, Inc.,
783 F.2d 1249, 1255 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[lIt encourages potential victims to buy insurance."); POSNER, supra note
77, at 152-53.
136. See Volunteers of Am. Colo. Branch v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080, 1087 (Colo. 2010); Martinez
v. Milburn Enters., Inc., 233 P.3d 205, 239 (Kan. 2010).
137. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The Act
imposes, for the first time, a requirement that most employers provide at least a minimum basic healthcare
package to their employees, or must give them vouchers to buy insurance from an insurance exchange.
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and reward rationales lose much of their force; people do not need to be
incentivized or rewarded for what they are already required to do. But, the way
the current legislation stands, the so-called "mandate" requiring health insurance
has a gap in that U.S. citizens still have the "choice" of not purchasing health
insurance. Instead, they can pay a rather small penalty.138 As such, there remains
some logic to instrumentalist rationales of allowing the collateral source rule to
"reward" citizens who have chosen to abide by the mandates and secure health
insurance.
The new federal healthcare regulations also undermine the contract-based
arguments that support the collateral source. 3 9 Because health insurance will be
compulsory, the contractual relationship between the insurer and insured takes on
a different character than that found in voluntary insurance policies. Under the
mandates, the expectations of the insured under the insurance contract will likely
change in such a way that the insured no longer has the expectation of cumulative
recovery in a tort action. When health insurance was voluntary, it was more akin
to the purchase of "contracts of investment" such as life or disability insurance.' 4'
These investment forms of insurance typically lack subrogation rights and are
subject to the collateral source rule. ' Investment policies are in significant
contrast to indemnity insurance, such as property insurance, which typically is
subject to subrogation and not the collateral source rule. 43 The mandatory nature
Employers that fail to meet their statutory obligations will be fined. Id. § 1511. Individuals will also be fined if
they could obtain affordable health insurance, either through employment or through an insurance exchange, but
fail to do so. Id. § 1501. Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 24 (2011) (noting that
individuals with income up to four-hundred percent of the federal poverty line can get federal subsidies for
insurance purchases).
138. Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Free Rider: A Justification for Mandatory Medical Insurance
Under Health Care Reform?, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 78 (2011), available at
http:/lwww.michiganlawreview.org/assets/f'tl09/kahn.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); THE STAFF
OF THE WASHINGTON POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S NEW HEALTH CARE LAW AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 89 (2010) ("The relatively small penalty and the prospect of loose enforcement
create a big potential problem: If many younger and healthier people decide to pay the fine instead of buying
coverage, rates will increase for those who do buy it."); see also Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2593-94 (2012).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84 (discussing contract arguments).
140. Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 540-41 ("[I]t is unlike private insurance in that the insured and the
insurer to not exchange consideration pursuant to the contract.").
141. Gobis, supra note 2, at 858, 865-67.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 222, 227 (Practitioner's ed.
1988) (noting that property insurance policies commonly include subrogation clauses but that life and accident
policies do not); Cecil G. King, Subrogation Under Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEX. L. REV. 62 (195 1);
Johnny C. Parker, The Made Whole Doctrine: Unraveling the Enigma Wrapped in the Mystery of Insurance
Subrogation, 70 Mo. L. REV. 723, 730 n.31 (2005). But see Cunningham v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d
33, 42 (Wis. 1985) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) ("The distinction between indemnity and investment contracts
for purposes of determining legal subrogation is a tenuous one .... "); Spencer L. Kimball & Don A. Davis, The
Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MICH. L. REV. 841, 851 (1962) (noting that it is often difficult to
2012 /An Enduring Oddity
of health insurance under the new federal legislation would likely create the
expectation that it is more akin to indemnity insurance (like property insurance,
which is often required by mortgagors'") and thus, the contract rationales
arguably no longer apply. If health insurance becomes required in a similar way
mortgagors require property insurance of homeowners, then the insured would
not have the expectation of cumulative recovery.' 45 If abrogation of the collateral
source rule and full subrogation rights in fact leads to lower insurance premiums,
then the insured benefits, albeit indirectly, from the abrogation of the collateral
source rule and is thus consistent with contract norms.'4 6 The confusion for courts
and consumers arises when the abrogation of the collateral source rule and the
imposition of subrogation are seen as a windfall for insurers.
147
On the other hand, the Affordable Care Act's multipayer market and
flexibility in insurance coverage continue to support a contract-based rationale
for the collateral source rule. Consumer-purchasers of insurance policies have the
choice, at least theoretically, of purchasing health insurance policies that allow
for cumulative recovery through the tort system. 41 Such policies are currently
available for life insurance purchasers 49 and there is no reason why similar
policies cannot be available for health insurance. A consumer could negotiate and
pay at a higher cost for a waiver of the insurer's subrogation rights in the health
insurance policy. 50 Since there will continue to be consumer choice under the
determine whether an insurance contract is one of indemnity or investment).
144. See Kenneth S. Klein, Following the Money-The Chaotic Kerfuffle When Insurance Proceeds
Simultaneously Are the Only Rebuild Funds and the Only Mortgage Collateral, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 305, 306,
318-19 (2010); William A. McNab, Minnesota Loss Payable Clauses in Fire Insurance Policies: Falling Short
of the Minimum Coverage Requirements, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 557, 557-58 (2000).
145. Martin v. La. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 94-0069 (La. 7/5/94); 638 So. 2d 1067, 1070 ("Legal
subrogation would bestow a windfall on [the insurer], which did not bargain for that benefit.").
146. See Abraham, Twenty-First-Century Insurance, supra note 5, at 106-07.
147. See, e.g., Cooper v. Argonaut Ins. Co,, 556 P.2d 525, 527 (Alaska 1976); DeCespedes v. Prudence
Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 227-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394
S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reitler, 628 P.2d 667, 670 (Mont. 1981); Maxwell v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 728 P.2d 812, 815 (Nev. 1986); Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 316 N.W.2d 348,
344-55 (Wis. 1982); see also Parker, supra note 143, at 737 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 576 P.2d 489
(Ariz. 1978)) (stating the insurer is unjustly enriched and gains a windfall if allowed both subrogation and
retention of the premiums paid by the insured); Keith E. Edeus, Jr., Comment, Subrogation of Personal Injury
Claims. Toward Ending an Inequitable Practice, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1997).
148. See Health Reform in Action, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/healthreform /healthcare-
overview (last visited Aug. 20, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (touting the Affordable Care Act
as "guarantee[ing] more choice"); see generally Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple.
Health Plan Benefit Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB. L. REV.
241 (2011).
149. Life insurance policies are often not permitted to have subrogation clauses. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Schmidt, 398 N.E.2d 589, 590 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
710 (3d ed. 2002); Uriel Procaccia, The Effect and Validity of Subrogation Clauses in Insurance Policies, 1973
INS. L.J. 573, 579 (1973); George Steven Swan, Subrogation in Life Insurance: Now Is the Time, 48 INS.
COuNS. J. 634, 638 (1981); West, supra note 40.
150. See, e.g., Alan M. Di Sciullo, Casualty and Insurance, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, REAL
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state and federal multipayer health insurance regimes, purchasers of policies that
permit cumulative recovery should benefit. Laws abrogating the collateral source
rule for such insurance policies are arguably infringing on the freedom to
contract.51 Under these investment insurance contracts, the insured should be
allowed to recover from both the tortfeasor under the tort system and under their
insurance policy as permitted under their contract. Abrogation of the collateral
source rule undermines this contractual right of the plaintiff-insured, which
would otherwise be permitted or even encouraged in a multipayer, competitive
insurance market as designed under the current Affordable Care Act.
The third argument favoring abrogation of the collateral source rule in light
of the Affordable Care Act is that jury instructions implementing the collateral
source rule may become more complicated. Under the collateral source rule,
jurors in a tort action are supposed to be shielded from and not consider the
compensation received by an injured plaintiff from his insurer when calculating
the plaintiff's damages.'52 Achieving this goal becomes more complicated once
all of the provisions of the Affordable Care Act take effect. If the Act achieves
near universal coverage, a juror would have a difficult time disregarding
insurance coverage for a plaintiff's tortious injuries since a juror will expect the
plaintiff to have insurance. Given that presumption, it would be less confusing to
allow a jury to consider a plaintiff's insurance recovery in calculating damages.
The Affordable Care Act's promotion of the multipayer health insurance
approach potentially provides a source of confusion to juries in the calculation of
damages. The collateral source rule's administrative simplicity would still justify
its continuance. Under the Affordable Care Act, the insured has the choice to
contract for a variety of levels of health insurance coverage. 3 Thus, a plaintiff
may have significant medical damages independent of those paid by the insurer
depending on the premiums being paid, co-payments, deductibles, and other
costs related to the coverage.'54 Without the collateral source rule, jurors would
face complex calculations to determine actual medical damages paid by the
plaintiff, which would vary depending on the details of the plaintiff's insurance
coverage.'55 To factor in the collateral source payments, the jury would have to
ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 560 PLI/REAL 79 (2008) (discussing waiver of
subrogation). Some jurisdictions make it impossible to buy health insurance policies without a subrogated
interest. See Krauss & Kidd, supra note 8, at 40 n.172 (noting that Quebec implies subrogation in insurance
policies).
151. Brendan S. Maher & Radha A. Pathak, Understanding and Problematizing Contractual Tort
Subrogation, 40 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 49, 74 (2008).
152. See Jacobsen, supra note 36, at 525-26.
153. See generally Oechsner & Schaler-Haynes, supra note 148 (discussing the regulatory options
available within the Affordable Care Act).
154. See Adam Marks, Good Health and Low Costs: Why the PPACA's Preventive Care Provisions
May Not Produce Expected Outcomes, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 486, 491-92 (2011) (conmenting on the
possible insurer-imposed additional costs above covered preventative care).
155. Patton, supra note 86, at 538 ("[T]he Court's decision to introduce into evidence medical bills of
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add or subtract co-pays and deductibles, adjust certain damages based on
discounts negotiated by some insurers and medical providers, and factor in
premium payments. 56 Under the complexities presented by a multipayer health
insurance system, imposing the collateral source rule would simplify the jury's
task in assessing medical damages to a more straightforward, market-cost
approach. The more complex discounting could then take place in post-verdict
adjustments. 57
In addition, the deterrence rationale would continue to justify the collateral
source rule. The Affordable Care Act does nothing to deter negligent behavior on
behalf of tortfeasors.'58 Abrogating the collateral source rule, absent subrogation,
allows the defendant's liability to be reduced and allows the defendant to escape
the full cost of the risk-taking behavior.'59 Even if an insurer maintains
subrogation and reimbursement rights, the collateral source rule prevents the
tortfeasor from benefitting when the insurer fails to exercise those rights.
Finally, the distributive benefits to plaintiffs would continue to justify the
collateral source rule. Neither the Affordable Care Act nor other changes in
healthcare laws, particularly on the state level, have made the costs of litigation
lower for tortiously injured plaintiffs.' 60 Conversely, tort reform legislation over
the past twenty years has made bringing a claim more expensive for plaintiffs.
6
'
Abrogating the collateral source rule would further tilt the tort compensation
system against injured plaintiffs. 62
While the changes to healthcare insurance, particularly the mandate (imposed
through tax) requiring the purchase of health insurance, undermine some of the
justifications for the collateral source rule, there appears to be no direct
legislation affecting the collateral source rule relating to healthcare damages in
vastly different amounts likely will result in additional confusion for juries and for both plaintiff and defense
counsel as they wrestle with the 'reasonable' cost of medical care."); see also supra notes 85-88 (discussing
administrative efficiency arguments as a justification for the rule).
156. Patton, supra note 86, at 560-61.
157. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (West 2011) (providing for the post-verdict reduction of a
damage award where collateral benefits have been previously paid to the plaintiff); Jim M. Perdue, Jr., Maybe It
Depends on What Your Definition of "Or" ls?-A Holistic Approach to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
§ 41.0105, the Collateral Source Rule, and Legislative History, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 241, 268 (2006);
Wershbale, supra note 98, at 356-57.
158. The Affordable Care Act does, however, allocate $50 million for the next five years for Health and
Human Services to award demonstration project grants to states to develop, implement, institute, and evaluate
alternatives to the current tort litigation system for resolving disputes about injuries caused by physicians and
other healthcare providers. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, §
10607 (2010); see also Steven M. Pavsner, Conflating Health Care Reform with Tort Reform, 6 MODERN AM.
58, 58-59 (2010).
159. See infra text accompanying notes 199-203 (discussing jurisdictions which prohibit subrogation
and have abrogated the collateral source rule).
160. See discussion of healthcare reform supra Part IV.
161. See discussion of tort reform supra Part III.
162. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting that the collateral source rule serves as an
equalizer for plaintiffs).
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tort actions. Enacting sweeping national healthcare reform, as embodied by the
Affordable Care Act, provided an opportunity to create greater coherency and
consistency to the collateral source rule across jurisdictions. A consistent and
systematic abrogation of the collateral source rule would provide positive effects
to the tort compensation system, provided it clarified subrogation rights and
passed on savings from lower litigation costs to health insurance consumers."'
The multipayer system, fragmentation of insurance markets, and the continued
contradictory jumble of state laws relating to the collateral source rule and
subrogation, however, provide for a continued role for the collateral source rule.
Many of the rationales in favor of maintaining the collateral source rule remain in
effect and, as a result, the current health insurance reform does little to change
the vitality of the rule.
V. THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE AND THE GROWTH OF SUBROGATION
The greatest force affecting the collateral source rule's viability in medical
insurance contexts is the growing use of subrogation by the insurance industry.' 64
Subrogation and reimbursement are common insurance policy provisions that
allow the insurer to seek repayment of some or all of the claims paid to the
insured.165 Subrogation allows the insurer to assert the rights (and claims) of the
insured against a third party.' 66 Reimbursement allows the insurer to seek
repayment of claims when the insured has received funds from another
responsible party.' 67 Often the terms "subrogation" and "reimbursement" are used
interchangeably.' 6' For the sake of simplicity, this Article uses the term
"subrogation" to refer to both reimbursement and subrogation by insurers.
Subrogation impacts the collateral source rule because if an insurer exercises
its subrogation right, the double-recovery effect of the collateral source rule
163. See generally Geistfeld, supra note 103, at 564 (arguing that legal ambiguity in general increases
costs).
164. Parker, supra note 143, at 736.
165. Subrogation is defined as "[t]he principle under which an insurer that has paid a loss under an
insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with
respect to any loss covered by the policy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed. 2004).
166. Subrogation has also been described as stepping into someone else's shoes and asserting their legal
claim. See KEETON & WiDISS, supra note 143, at 219; JERRY, II, supra note 149, at 676.
167. Those in favor of permitting subrogation cite it as a way to decrease the growing cost of health
insurance. According to data from insurers, the elimination of subrogation would cause "an increase of 5% to
12% in insurance premiums." RICHARD C. ALKIRE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMIIrEE TO STUDY
SUBROGATION, R.C. 3965, 112th Cong., at 162 (Ohio 2009), available at https://www.ohiobar.org/General
%20Resources/pubs/councilfiles/SpecSubComReport.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
168. See, e.g., Vernon E. Leverty, Confusion Abounds Subrogation/Reinibursement in Health Insurance
Policies and Plans, FED'N REG. COUNS., INC., http://www.forc.org/pdfs/vol16-ed4-art5.pdf (last visited Feb. 27,
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); 16 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 226:4 (3d ed. 2005).
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disappears. 69 Under subrogation, the plaintiff recovers damages which exclude
the collateral insurance payments subrogated to the insurer and the defendant
pays the full measure of damages to the plaintiff and subrogated insurer.7
Subrogation, however, does not trump the collateral source rule.'' Instead,
the collateral source rule and subrogation have a symbiotic relationship. Whether
and how the collateral source rule will be applied in any given jurisdiction or in
any particular case depends on the relevant subrogation rules in the jurisdiction
and the subrogation rights provided by the insurance policy.' Any discussion of
changing or abrogating the collateral source rule in a given jurisdiction must be
done in conjunction with an examination and understanding of the subrogation
rules of that same jurisdiction.'73 The fragmentation in this area of the law is
particularly acute and confusing."'
The inconsistencies in these areas of the law add to the fragmentation,
uncertainties, and cost to both the tort and healthcare systems in the United
States. '7 Thus, both the tort and healthcare insurance systems would benefit from
greater systemization of these areas of law.16
A. The Inter-Relationship of Subrogation and the Collateral Source Rule in the
Tort Damage Determination Process
Subrogation has long been recognized in both civil and common law. 177 While
advocates of subrogation call the doctrine "favored,"'' 78 in fact, many jurisdictions
have given it a rather chilly reception' 79 and there have been efforts to roll back or
169. Schwartz v. Hasty, 175 S.W.3d 621, 626-27 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 630
N.W.2d 201, 211 (Wis. 2001); Saine, supra note 2, at 1103.
170. Saine, supra note 2, at 1103.
171. See Wershbale, supra note 98, at 353-54 (discussing the relationship between the collateral source
rule and subrogation in "post-verdict collateral source reduction"). But see Fischer v. Steffen, 797 N.W.2d 501,
521 (Wis. 2011); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 11 N.W.2d 764, 772 n.1 (Wis. 2000).
172. Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 641-43 (Wash. 1998).
173. Kenneth S. Abraham succinctly lays out this inter-relationship between the collateral source rule
and subrogation in Twenty-First-Century Insurance, supra note 5.
174. Steven Flower, Note, Toward Correcting the Misapplication of Subrogation Doctrine in California
Healthcare, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1066 (2003); Jeffrey A. Greenblatt, Comment, Insurance and
Subrogation: When the Pie Isn't Big Enough, Who Eats Last?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (1997); see also
Goldsmith, supra note 2 (arguing that the "disparate application of the collateral source rule" is particularly
troublesome, and there should be some "uniformity in the application of the rule").
175. See Hoffman, supra note 7.
176. See Maher & Pathak, supra note 151, at 57-58; Abigail R. Moncrieff, Federalization Snowballs:
The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 844, 889 (2009) (discussing
systemization in the context of medical malpractice reform).
177. See, e.g., HENRY N. SHELDON, SUBROGATION 1-3 (2d ed. 1893); James Morfit Mullen, The
Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation, 3 MD. L. REV. 201, 201 (1939).
178. Hourihan & Zeitounzian, supra note 16, at 27 (citing Bonham v. Coe, 12 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1937)).
179. Roger M. Baron, Subrogation. A Pandora's Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV. 237, 238
(1996); Roger M. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims: The "Double Recovery" Myth and the
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abolish it.8 The differences in the receptions to subrogation usually stem from
,81 182whether the subrogation is being applied under a statute, contract, or
equitable principles."3
The laws of subrogation arising under equity are not well settled under the
common law. Historically, courts did not allow equitable subrogation of personal
injury claims due to the common law prohibitions against assignment of personal
injury claims and against splitting personal injury causes of action.'8 4 Conversely,
when an insurance contract expressly provides for subrogation, its enforceability
is "a well settled rule of law."' 85 Indeed, most jurisdictions hold that an insurer
has no right to subrogation absent express statutory or contractual language
permitting subrogation and reimbursement.8 However, a number of jurisdictions
statutorily prohibited subrogation provisions in health insurance contracts.
87
These statutes have been preempted by federal legislation for most health
insurance policies, specifically those covered by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)."s
Feasibility of Anti-Subrogation Laws, 96 DICK. L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1992) [hereinafter Baron, Subrogation on
Medical Expense Claims].
180. Michelle J. d'Arcambal, The Assault on Subrogation, in ALI-ABA CONFERENCE ON LIFE
INSURANCE LITIGATION 461 (ALI-ABA eds., 1997); Edeus, Jr., supra note 147, at 512-13.
181. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006) (creating a right of subrogation for Medicaid and
Medicare); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000) (permitting, under ERISA, an insurer to "appropriate equitable
relief," which has been interpreted as allowing for subrogation rights); see also Ashley Aunita Prebula Frazier,
Note, ERISA Subrogation and the Controversy Over Sereboff: Silencing the Critics, the Divided Bench Is a
Legitimate Standard, 45 GA. L. REV. 579, 620 (2011).
182. This is also sometimes called "conventional subrogation." Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 640
(Wash. 1998) (citing Ross v. Jones, 24 P.2d 622, 626 (Wash. 1933)).
183. This is often called "legal" or "equitable subrogation." Id.; S. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE
THEORY AND PRACTICE 22 (1964). "The doctrine of subrogation in insurance does not arise from, nor is it
dependent upon, statute or custom or any of the terms of the contract; it has its origin in general principles of
equity and in the nature of the insurance contract as one of indemnity. The right of subrogation rests not upon a
contract, but upon the principles of natural justice." Wimberly v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn.
1979) (citations and internal quotations omitted), cited in Parker, supra note 143.
184. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims, supra note 179, at 583; see also Mahler, 957 P.2d
at 641; Frost v. Porter Leasing Corp., 436 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1982).
185. Schuldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 270, 273 (S.D. 1975) (quoting Parker v.
Hardy, 73 S.D. 247, 248 (S.D. 1950)); see also F. Joseph Du Bray, A Response to the Anti-Subrogation
Argument: What Really Emerged from Pandora's Box, 41 S.D. L. REV. 264, 268 (1996).
186. See, e.g., Schultz v. Gotlund, 561 N.E.2d 652, 654 (111. 1990); Wolters v. Am. Republic Ins. Co.,
827 A.2d 197, 202 (N.H. 2003); Frost, 436 N.E.2d at 390-91; McCan Foods, Inc. v. Gerard, 489 A.2d 503,
504-05 (Me. 1985); Perreira v. Rediger, 778 A.2d 429, 437-38 (N.J. 2001); Shumpert v. Time Ins. Co., 496
S.E.2d 653, 656-58 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); Russ & Segalla, supra note 168, § 222:26 (citing cases); Allen E.
Korpela, Annotation, Right of "Blue Cross" or "Blue Shield," or Similar Hospital or Medical Service
Organization, to be Subrogated to Certificate Holder's Claims Against Tortfeasor, 73 A.L.R.3d 1140, 1147-48
(1976).
187. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3405 (2009); Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 292
(4th Cir. 2003) (saving Maryland anti-subrogation statute from ERISA preemption); Med. Mut. of Ohio v.
Desoto, 245 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding California antisubrogation statute).
188. Those policies not covered by ERISA are governed by state law. See Empire Healthchoice
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677 (2006) (holding suit by health insurer of federal employees for
989
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As a result of the well-established recognition of contractual subrogation,
most health insurance contracts now provide for subrogation and
reimbursement. 8 9 But this "well-settled" common law rule permitting contractual
subrogation has come under assault by courts and legislatures restricting the
subrogation rights of the insurers in favor of the insured's right of full
compensation in tort actions.' 9° Courts have not uniformly held that federal
legislation preempts these subrogation restrictions.' 9' This jurisdictional split is
even more stark when federal law does not preempt the insurance contract's
subrogation provisions, such as when an insurance plan covers state
governmental units.
92
Most jurisdictions permit both subrogation and application of the collateral
source rule.' 93 In these jurisdictions, the jury issues a verdict and awards the
reimbursement from state tort action governed by state law and not preempted by Federal Employees Health
Benefits Act); d'Arcambal, supra note 180.
189. Korpela, supra note 186.
190. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass. v. Trull, Civ. A. No. 93-02026, 1995 WL 419946
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1995).
191. See J. Thomas Allen, Comment, ERISA Subrogation and Reimbursement Claims: A Vote to Reject
Federal Common Law Adoption of a Default "Make Whole" Rule, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 223, 228-30 (2009).
192. See, e.g., Ninaus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 584 N.W.2d 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (self-
funded plan uses state subrogation law).
193. Arkansas: Am. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 753 S.W.2d 530 (Ark. 1988) (recognizing
contractual subrogation); Green Forest Pub. Sch. v. Herrington, 696 S.W.2d 714 (Ark. 1985) (recognizing the
collateral source rule); California: Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 77 (Cal. 1970); West v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 106 Cal. Rptr. 486 (Ct. App. 1973); Colorado: Powell v. Brady, 496 P.2d 328,
332-33 (Colo. App. 1972), affid, 508 P.2d 1254. But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111.6 (West 2004)
(retaining the common law collateral source rule for certain benefits received by plaintiff); Volunteers of Am.
Colo. Branch v. Gardenswartz, 242 P.3d 1080, 1084 (Colo. 2010); W. Cas. & Surety Co. v. Bowling, 565 P.2d
1130 (Colo. App. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 801 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1990) (recognizing subrogation);
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3320 (West 2011); Yarrington v. Thornburg, 205 A.2d I (Del. 1964)
(recognizing collateral source rule); Givens v. Street, 405 A.2d 704 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (permitting
subrogation); District of Columbia: District of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(recognizing collateral source rule); Miller v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 203 A.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (permitting
subrogation); Hawaii: Beneficial Haw., Inc. v. Kida, 30 P.3d 895 (Haw. 2001) (recognizing subrogation);
Boudreau v. Gen. Elec. Co., 625 P.2d 384, 389 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing the collateral source rule by
implication); Idaho: Rinehart v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 524 P.2d 1343 (Idaho 1974)
(recognizing contractual subrogation); Swift & Co. v. Gutierez, 277 P.2d 559, 561 (Idaho 1954) (recognizing
the collateral source rule): Illinois: Wills v. Foster, 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1027 (Ill. 2008) (affirming the collateral
source rule); Schultz v. Gotlund, 561 N.E.2d 652 (il. 1990) (prohibiting equitable subrogation but permitting
contractual subrogation); Iowa: Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heiken, 675 N.W.2d 820 (Iowa 2004) (recognizing
subrogation); Stewart v. Madison, 278 N.W.2d 284, 293 (Iowa 1979) (recognizing the collateral source rule);
Kentucky: City of Louisville v. McDonald, 819 S.W.2d 319 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Our Lady of Mercy Hosp. v.
McIntosh, 461 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Louisiana: Savoie v. McCall's Boat Rentals, Inc., 85-582
(La. App. 3 Cir. 10/3/86); 491 So. 2d 94, 104, cert. denied, 494 So. 2d 542 (La. 1986), 494 So. 2d 334 (La.
1986); Brister v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 89-6 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/23/90); 562 So. 2d 1040;
Maine: McCain Foods, Inc. v. Gerard, 489 A.2d 503 (Me. 1985) (recognizing contractual but not equitable
subrogation); Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329 (Me. 1978); Maryland: Norfolk S. Ry. Corp., v. Tiller, 944 A.2d
1272, 1278 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Roberts v. Total Health Care, Inc., 675 A.2d 995 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1996), cert. granted by 683 A.2d 178 (Md. 1996), aff'd by 709 A.2d 142 (Md. 1998); Michigan: MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 550.1401(5) (West Supp. 2011); Nasser v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 457 N.W.2d 637, 649 (Mich.
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plaintiff damages that exclude collateral source payments. However, the
subrogated insurer is able to recover its subrogated interests directly from the
plaintiff's damage award.'" Consistent with traditional policy rationales of the
collateral source rule, these jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to receive cumulative
recovery if the insurer fails or is unable to exercise subrogation. 9 However, in a
few jurisdictions, the court withholds a final judgment until it determines a
subrogor' s rights. 1
96
1990); Mississippi: Busick v. St. John, 2002-CA-0101 I-SCT (9 14) (Miss. 2003); Hare v. State, 97-CA-01443-
SCT (Miss. 1999) (permitting subrogation but requiring make-whole); Nebraska: Huenink v. Collins, 147
N.W.2d 508, 509 (Neb. 1966); Jensen v. Bd. of Regents, 684 N.W.2d 537 (Neb. 2004) (subrogation permitted
but subject to make-whole requirements); New Hampshire: Merchs. Mut. Ins. Group v. Orthopedic Prof'l
Ass'n, 480 A.2d 840, 844 (N.H. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Rooney v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 645 A.2d 52 (N.H. 1994); Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.H.-Vt. v. St. Cyr, 459 A.2d 226 (N.H. 1983); New
Mexico: Health Plus of N.M., Inc. v. Harrell, 1998-NMCA-064, 14, 125 N.M. 189, 958 P.2d 1239, 1243;
Hansen v. Skate Ranch, 641 P.2d 517, 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982); North Dakota: Keller v. Gama, 378 N.W.2d
867, 868 (N.D. 1985); Tschider v. Burtts, 149 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1967); Oklahoma: Am. Med. Sec. v.
Josephson, 2000 OK CIV APP 127, 15 P.3d 976 (permitting subrogation subject to make whole requirements);
Burk Royalty Co. v. Jacobs, 387 P.2d 638, 640 (Okla. 1963); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 742.534 (West
2009); White v. Jubitz Corp., 219 P.3d 566 (Or. 2009); Pennsylvania: Chow ex rel. Chow v. Rosen, 812 A.2d
587 (Pa. 2002); Beechwoods Flying Serv., Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 476 A.2d 350 (Pa. 1984). But
see 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1720 (West 2006) (prohibiting subrogation in actions arising out use of motor
vehicles); Rhode Island: Soucy v. Martin, 402 A.2d 1167, 1170 (R.I. 1979); Hosp. Serv. Corp. of R.I. v. Pa.
Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105 (R.I. 1967); South Carolina: Joiner v. Fort, 84 S.E.2d 719 (S.C. 1954); Shumpert v.
Time Ins. Co., 496 S.E.2d 653 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); South Dakota: Papke v. Harbert, 2007 SD 87 1 59-80,
738 N.W.2d 510, 530--37; Schuldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 238 N.W.2d 270 (S.D. 1975); Tennessee:
Wimberly v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, Penn., 584 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tenn. 1979) (permits subrogation subject
to make-whole requirements); Benson v. Tenn. Valley Elec. Co-Op., 868 S.W.2d 630, 640 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1993); Texas: Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642, 645-50 (Tex. 2007); April Y. Quifiones, Comment,
Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 41.0105: A Time for Clarification, 42 ST. MARY'S L.J. 551 (2011);
Utah: Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 1030-31 (Utah 1995); DuBois
v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823, 825 (Utah 1978); Vermont: Ulm v. Ford Motor Co., 750 A.2d 981, 992-93 (Vt. 2000);
My Sister's Place v. City of Burlington, 433 A.2d 275, 281 (Vt. 1981); Washington: Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 953 P.2d 800 (Wash. 1998); Paulsen v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 898 P.2d 353, 354-56 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1995) (recognizing subrogation subject to make-whole requirements); West Virginia: Richards v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 803, 805 (W. Va. 1995); Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1981); Wisconsin:
Lambert v. Wrensch, 399 N.W.2d 369 (Wis. 1987); Wyoming: Wheatland Irrigation Dist. v. McGuire, 562
P.2d 287, 301-02 (Wyo. 1977); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Postin, 610 P.2d 984 (Wyo. 1980). For recent
surveys on the collateral source rule see, 3 STEIN, supra note 38, § 19:34; Benjet, supra note 95, at 211;
Wershbale, supra note 98. A good survey on state subrogation laws can be found in WICKERT, supra note 16, §
10.09. Note that in many of these jurisdictions, actions involving medical malpractice do not permit the
collateral source rule. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (West
1999); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508 (West Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-34.1 (West
1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 2006).
194. See, e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Q-E Mfr. Co., No. 06-CV-0437, 2006 WL 2136244, at *2 (M.D. Pa.
July 28, 2006) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Di Tomo, 478 A.2d 1381 (Pa. Super. Ct. (1984)) ("An
insurer is under Pennsylvania law generally not entitled to exercise a right to compensation until its insured has
been fully compensated for the insured's injuries.").
195. See, e.g., Valora v. Penn. Emps. Benefit Trust Fund, 939 A.2d 312 (Pa. 2007) (subrogation waived
by delay to exercise right by insurer).
196. Wershbale, supra note 98, at 351 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10 (West 1993); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 2906 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.6303 (West 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-
4.5 (West 2008)).
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Some states choose to prohibit subrogation and leave the collateral source
rule in place.' In such jurisdictions, if the antisubrogation laws are not pre-
empted, plaintiffs receive cumulative damages from the defendant for any
collateral insurance payments, and the insurer is unable to recoup these
payments.'98 Post-verdict reductions based on collateral sources do not occur
since subrogation is prohibited.
Conversely, there are some jurisdictions where state law prohibits
subrogation and has abrogated the collateral source rule.' 99 In these jurisdictions,
the plaintiffs collateral benefits reduce the defendant's liability.2 0 In addition,
absent preemption, the plaintiff s insurer in these jurisdictions is prohibited from
seeking indemnity though subrogation. 20 ' These jurisdictions clearly allow the
defendant (or the defendant's liability insurer) to profit from the plaintiff's
collateral insurance benefits. For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
found that, in abrogating the collateral source rule, the legislature favored
liability carriers over subrogating health insurers. 3
Finally, a number of jurisdictions permit subrogation but prohibit the
collateral source rule in determining the verdict. In these jurisdictions, abrogating
the collateral source rule can take two forms. In one jurisdiction, the collateral
source rule has been abrogated completely, including during the trial itself.-2 04 In
197. See, e.g., Arizona: Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 P.3d 487, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006)
(allowing the collateral source rule); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Knapp, 484 P.2d 180 (Ariz. 1971)
(prohibiting subrogation); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-56.1 (West 1996) (prohibiting subrogation but
permitting reimbursement in some circumstances); Thurman v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 598 S.E.2d 448
(Ga. 2004); McGlohon v. Ogden, 308 S.E.2d 541, 542 (Ga. 1983) (permitting the collateral source rule);
Kansas: Hayes Sight & Sound, Inc. v. ONEOK, Inc., 136 P.3d 428, 440-41 (Kan. 2006) (affirming the
collateral source rule); Clements v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 753 P.2d 1274 (Kan. 1988) (upholding
antisubrogation statute); Massachusetts: Corsetti v. Stone Co., 483 N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1985); Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Mass., Inc. v. Trull, Civ. A. No. 93-02026, 1995 WL 419946, *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 31,
1995) (voiding subrogation clause for public policy reasons); Missouri: Deck v. Teasley, 322 S.W.3d 536, 538
(Mo. 2010) (recognizing the collateral source rule); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418,
425 (Mo. Ct. App.1965) (prohibiting subrogation as to medical payments); North Carolina: 11 N.C. ADMIN.
CODE 12.0319 (2009) (prohibiting subrogation in health insurance forms); Scallon v. Hooper, 293 S.E.2d 843,
844 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); Virginia: Hines v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Va., 788 F.2d 1016, 1018 (4th Cir.
1986) (broadly applying antisubrogation statute); Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 320 (Va. 2000).
198. See, e.g., Hines, 788 F.2d at 1018.
199. Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2011) (allowing post-verdict
reduction based on collateral sources); id. § 52-225c (prohibiting subrogation in the context of personal injury
or wrongful death suits); New Jersey: Kiss v. Jacob, 650 A.2d 336 (N.J. 1994).
200. See Kiss, 650 A.2d at 338-40.
201. See id.
202. Id.
203. Id.; see also Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 2005); Perreira v. Rediger,
778 A.2d 429, 431 (N.J. 2001).
204. Alabama abrogates the collateral source rule as a rule of evidence at trial. ALA. CODE § 12-21-45
(2011); see also Danielle A. Daigle, Commentary, The Collateral Source Rule in Alabama: A Practical
Approach to Future Application of the Statutes Abrogating the Doctrine, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1249 (2002).
Alabama permits legal subrogation. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Ala. Gen. Ins. Co., 150 So. 2d 688 (Ala.
1963).
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this jurisdiction, the jury will issue a verdict taking into consideration the
collateral sources and thus the final verdict will reflect a reduction in these
collateral sources.2 °5 In Alabama, the plaintiffs insurer, however, would be able
to exercise its subrogation rights against the defendant and receive an award from
the defendant directly rather than through the post-verdict reduction procedure
found in other jurisdictions.O
Correspondingly, in the remaining jurisdictions, the collateral source rule
remains in effect during the trial as a rule of evidence, but is abrogated during a
post-verdict calculation of damages.2 7 In these jurisdictions, the jury or the judge
only considers and reduces the verdict based on the collateral benefits received
by the plaintiff after issuing an initial verdict without considering such sources.
In other words, the collateral source rule is abrogated only in the post-verdict
stage of the trial.209 These jurisdictions do not allow the plaintiff to receive
cumulative recovery even if the insurer fails or is unable to exercise
subrogation." °
This survey of the application of the collateral source rule and subrogation
shows that, outside of medical malpractice actions 2, only one jurisdiction has
completely abrogated the collateral source rule in the damages determination
process when taking into account subrogation rights.212 Most states retain the rule
and allow subrogation to mitigate any double-recovery concerns."3 In states that
have abrogated the rule for the purposes of determining a final damages award,
205. See Continental Bank & Trust Co., 150 So. 2d 688.
206. See Melvin v. Loats, 23 So. 3d 666 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009).
207. Alaska: ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 9.17.070 (West 2010) (allowing for post-verdict damages
reductions based on collateral sources); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 663 P.2d 953
(Alaska 1983) (permitting subrogation); Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 902 P.2d 1328, 1333
(Alaska 1995); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (West 2011) (requiring post-verdict reduction of
collateral sources but retaining the rule pre-trial); Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2001);
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1401(5) (West 2002 & Supp. 2011) (permitting health insurance
subrogation); id. § 600.6303 (West 2000) (requiring post-verdict collateral source reduction); Foremost Life Ins.
Co. v. Waters, 329 N.W.2d 688 (Mich. 1982) (allowing subrogation); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.251
(West 2010) (allowing post-verdict damages reduction of collateral sources); Westendorf v. Stasson, 330
N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1983) (subrogation permitted); New York: N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4545(c) (MCKINNEY SUPP.
2012); see also In re Sept. II Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 171, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
208. See, e.g., Sheffield, 800 So. 2d 197.
209. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (jurisdictions abrogating the collateral source rule post-
verdict).
210. See id.
211. A number of jurisdictions that otherwise recognize the collateral source rule abrogate it in medical
malpractice actions. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (West
1999); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.508 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19-34.1 (West 1997); WiS.
STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 2006); see also Schap & Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule, supra note 107, at 89
tbl. 1.
212. See supra note 204 (discussing Alabama's abrogation of the collateral source rule).
213. See supra note 193.
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the rule operates to exclude evidence of collateral sources during the trial. 14
Thus, the vast majority of jurisdictions continue to use the rule in some form in
determining tort damages.
B. The Continuing Role of the Collateral Source Rule in Pre-Verdict Trial
Proceedings and Subrogation in Post-Trial Proceedings
Despite the predictions that subrogation would supplant or obviate the
collateral source rule, in most jurisdictions, it implicates the collateral source
rule. Similarly, tort reform legislation that sought to abolish the collateral source
rule did not remove the rule from the trial process, but only abrogated it post-
verdict. '5
The way in which a subrogor exercises its rights can affect the collateral
source rule. If the insurer has full subrogation rights, there are two approaches
available to the insurer to exercise those rights.2 6 First, the insurer could wait
until after the court enters the judgment and the jury has determined total liability
to the plaintiff's economic and noneconomic damages (or a settlement on these
damages reached by the parties).2' 7 The insurer could then exercise its
subrogation rights and be reimbursed out of this judgment (or settlement),
thereby reducing the plaintiff's total award.2 8 In such a situation, the collateral
source rule would still be pertinent in restricting the jury's access to information
regarding the plaintiff's insurance coverage since this information might lower
the jury's damage award, confuse the jury, and make the calculation of damages
more difficult.
219
Second, the insurer could bring an action directly against the tortfeasor either
before or after the insured brings an action, or could intervene in the plaintiff's
220action. In these circumstances, the insurer pursues a separate derivative action
against the defendant for subrogated damages in the form of expenses paid to the
plaintiff under the insurance policy. 2' In this situation, the collateral source rule
214. See supra note 207.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 207-10.
216. The insurer's rights of subrogation to recoup medical expenses paid to its insured are generally
governed by the terms of the company's contract with its insured. See 2 STEIN, supra note 38, § 7:34; 16 Russ
& SEGALLA, supra note 168, § 225:152.
217. Often this is done by the insurer-subrogee intervening and filing an action against the verdict or
settlement. See, e.g., Fla. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Martin, 377 So. 2d 827, 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 661 P.2d 987, 990 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983); Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 316 N.W.2d 348, 354 (Wis. 1982); see also Prewitt & Sampson v. City of Dallas, 713 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1986) (subrogation rights can be recovered without intervention).
218. See Wershbale, supra note 98, at 354.
219. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Davis v. Okaloosa Cty., 620 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. App. 1993); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 580 N.W.2d 788 (Iowa 1998).
221. See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 580N.W.2d 788.
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would indeed lose its pertinence; the nature of the claim the insurer brings would
defeat the rule and would not insulate the jury from evidence of the collateral
source. It is only when insurers exercise their subrogation rights directly against
the defendant, rather than through reimbursement, that the collateral source rule
loses much of its purpose and warrants abrogation of the rule.222 However,
insurers typically do not bring direct actions, because insurers have no cause of
action against a tortfeasor for recovering future benefits; thus, insurers depend on
the insured to pursue claims for future economic damages.223
When an insurer exercises its subrogation rights after a jury determines
liability, the collateral source rule continues to play a vital function in the
appropriate determination of the jury's award. Indeed, in the majority of
jurisdictions that allow subrogation, defendants may seek a post-verdict collateral
source reduction.224 At a post-verdict hearing, both parties may present evidence
of the plaintiff's collateral benefits, subrogation or reimbursement rights by third
parties, and any payments by the plaintiff to secure the collateral benefits.225 Prior
to this post-verdict hearing, the collateral source rule remains in effect.
226
Under the post-verdict reduction procedure, courts can impose and work into
the calculations of final damages for the insured and third-party insurer make-
whole rules limiting subrogation claims. 227 The make-whole doctrine requires the
insurer to wait until the insured has fully recovered for all losses not covered by
the insurance; then the insurer is entitled to recover from the plaintiff-insured
under its subrogation rights any amount paid by the defendant beyond those other
228damages. This process provides an important role for the collateral source rule
as well. Since the jury needs to determine all of a plaintiff's damages, both
economic and noneconomic, the jury benefits from applying the collateral source
rule in determining the full measure of damages.229 Indeed, both the plaintiff and
the insurer benefit from the collateral source rule in this situation because both
the plaintiff and insurer seek to maximize the plaintiff's award.
230
222. See, e.g., Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 784 N.Y.S.2d 284 (App. Div. 2003). If
collateral benefits are introduced at trial, then the source of those benefits such as an insurer, may not recover
their subrogation rights against the plaintiff. See Schap & Feeley, (Much) More, supra note 110.
223. See Metcalfe v. Bruning Div. of AMI, 868 P.2d 1145 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993), cited in Paul Gordon,
Judicial Apportionment of Personal Injury Claims, 29 COLO. LAW. 77 (2000).
224. See Crossgrove v. Wallmart Stores, Inc., No. 09CA0689, 2010 WL 2521744 (Colo. App. June 24,
2010) (The collateral source rule remained in effect in the face of a Colorado statute that modified the collateral
source rule.); Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 800 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2000).
225. See Wershbale, supra note 98, at 350-54, cited in Crossgrove, 2010 WL 2521744.
226. See Crossgrove, 2010 WL 2521744; see also Wershbale, supra note 98, at 353-54.
227. See, e.g., Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 234 S.W.3d 642 (Tex. 2007); see also Parker, supra note 143, at
737-76; d'Arcambal, supra note 180.
228. Parker, supra note 143, at 737; Greenblatt, supra note 174, at 1339-40.
229. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text (discussing retention of the collateral source rule as
a way to curb jury confusion as they consider a multitude of factors in determining damages).
230. As indicated earlier, abrogation of the collateral source rule would likely cause the jury to award
lower damages. See supra note 86 (citing sources advocating use of the rule to prevent jury confusion).
2012 IAn Enduring Oddity
Since a majority of jurisdictions have implemented make-whole doctrines
that restrict full subrogation and encourage post-claim reduction of jury
verdicts,23' the collateral source rule will continue to play a vital role as a rule of
evidence and in calculating the initial verdict. Rather than leading to the demise
of the collateral source rule, subrogation and laws relating to its restrictions and
administration permit the collateral source rule to endure at the pre-verdict stage
of a torts trial.
Under the current patchwork of multipayer insurance plans and fragmented
markets, uniformly applying post-verdict reduction of collateral source benefits
under subrogation can result in greater coherency in injury compensation. Within
post-verdict reduction jurisdictions, the collateral source rule remains in effect in
the pre-verdict stage as a rule of evidence and allows the jury to determine a
verdict for damages that excludes considering plaintiff's collateral benefits. 32
This approach, used by a number of jurisdictions, permits the judge in the post-
verdict reduction stage of a torts trial to consider the exact subrogation rights
permitted under the parties' insurance contract, any equitable subrogation rights
permitted by law, and any make-whole limitations.233 A uniform pre-verdict
application of the collateral source rule would provide significant normative
benefits for the torts and insurance claim processes, providing coherence to an
inefficient and fragmented injury compensation process. 34 Wholesale attacks on
the collateral source rule and movements to abrogate the rule are, thus,
misguided.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite the prognostications of a number of scholars concerning the dissolution
of the collateral source rule, the doctrine remains alive. It does so even in the face of
the tort reform movement which sought to abolish it, recent legislation such as the
Affordable Care Act, which undercut important instrumentalist rationales supporting
it, and the rise of subrogation, which weakened the rule's effect. While the
cumulative recovery traditionally permitted by the collateral source rule has been
significantly scaled back by changes in the law brought about by tort reform and
subrogation, the rule otherwise endures.
The collateral source rule plays an important normative function in tort law,
particularly in determining medical care damages. Some scholars, however,
predicted this function would diminish in the face of changes to healthcare insurance
in the United States and the increase in subrogation. In addition, changes to federal
231. WICKERT supra note 16, § 2.08; see also Hourihan & Zeitounzian, surpa note 16, at 23.
232. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (providing the mechanics of post-verdict application of
the collateral source rule).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 224-26.
234. See Goldsmith, supra note 2 (arguing that the "disparate application of the collateral source rule" is
particularly troublesome, and there should be some "uniformity in the application of the rule").
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law relating to health insurance weakened some of the justifications for the collateral
source rule.
Nevertheless, the continued fragmentation and incoherence found under the
multipayer approach to national healthcare legislation leaves a continuing role for the
collateral source rule in most jurisdictions. The current multipayer system, which
allows the choice of policies available to insurance purchasers, supports retaining the
collateral source rule under contract-based and instrumentalist rationales.
Ironically, the rise of subrogation has contributed to the continuing vitality of the
collateral source rule as a rule of evidence, while diminishing the rule's cumulative
benefits for plaintiffs. While the rise of subrogation formed the basis of predictions of
the collateral source rule's demise, subrogation rules found in many jurisdictions
retain the collateral source rule for important administrative and equitable purposes
in the pre-verdict trial process. Only where an insurer exercises its subrogation rights
directly against the defendant does the collateral source rule lose its purpose and
abrogation would appear appropriate. Direct actions by insurers to enforce their
subrogation rights, however, are not the norm and are not compatible with make-
whole doctrines that many jurisdictions embrace. Post-judgment reductions of the
plaintiff's verdict are the more common and advantageous mechanism for
determining damages in a tort action.
The collateral source rule, while advancing important normative policies in
individual cases, does little to improve the coherence of the tort system as a whole.
The conflicting approaches to the collateral source rule found across jurisdictions
reflect the incoherence and fragmentation found in the health insurance markets in
the United States. In the absence of a more unified healthcare insurance system,
however, the collateral source rule will continue to play important instrumental and
administrative functions in the tort system. If applied purposefully, particularly in the
pre-verdict part of a torts trial, the collateral source rule improves the torts process.
The prognostications of the demise of the collateral source rule will not be
fulfilled in the near future and will only come about if the healthcare insurance
system becomes more cohesive and consistent through a single-payer system or a
similar uniformity-creating mechanism. A more unified and less fragmented system
has the potential to not only provide coherence and efficiencies in the healthcare
insurance system, but also provide greater coherence to the tort process in general
and the collateral source rule in particular. Until a more unified healthcare insurance
system comes about, the collateral source rule will endure.
